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2 
Abstract  
 
The extensive human smuggling networks that have emerged around North Africa and 
the Sahel have inaugurated a significant shift in the economic landscape of a region that has 
traditionally been characterized by the gray economy and precarious political arrangements.  
Ample and detailed research has been produced that highlights how militia groups and non-state 
actors have been tapping into these flows (via taxation of routes and racketeering against non-
armed smuggling enterprises) in order to fund their various projects. The way in which this new 
economic landscape is affecting local political arrangements is a heretofore little considered, yet 
highly consequential, development of the recent ‘migrant crisis’. This paper argues that 
emergence of migrant smuggling as a central economic pillar of Northern Mali has produced a 
more diversified and decentralized economic landscape, which in turn has led to a more diffused 
political environment that goes some way towards accounting for the protracted and 
fractionalized nature of the conflict. By exploring the effect of migration flows on conflict, as 
opposed to the other way around, this paper hopes provide an updated account of the political 
economic landscapes of conflict zones where migrant smuggling serves as a central pillar, as 
well as anticipate how the emerging 'age of migration' will impact some of the world's most 
vulnerable and unstable regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Tables of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction         4 
Research Question and Hypothesis        5 
The Case of Conflict in Mali         6 
Chapter 2: Literature Review        13 
Greed, Grievance, and Opportunity Structures in Conflict Zones    14 
The Globalized War Economy and Regionalized Conflict     19 
Beyond Resource Reductionism        23 
A Return to a Political Economic Approach       27 
Decentralization and fragmentation        30 
Conclusion           35 
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework        38 
Hierarchies and Networks         39 
Decentralization and Defection        41 
Mali’s War Economy: Breeding ground for fragmentation?     48 
Conclusion           53 
Chapter 4: The Case of Conflict in Mali       55 
1990s: ‘The Second Tuareg Rebellion’       56 
Breaking of the Bonds: Run-up to 2012 and breakdown of the post-1990s order  62 
Chapter 5: 2012 and the Emergence of Migrant Smuggling    72 
The Emergence of the Migrant Smuggling Economy     80 
Chapter 6: Conclusion         90 
Bibliography           96 
4 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the effect of irregular migration flows on the nature of conflict in and 
across the hinterlands of the Sahara. The extensive smuggling networks that have emerged 
around these flows have inaugurated a significant shift in the economic landscape of a region 
that has traditionally been characterized by the gray economy and precarious political 
arrangements. Surprisingly extensive and detailed research has been produced that highlights 
how militia groups and non-state actors have been tapping into these flows (via taxation of routes 
and racketeering against non-armed smuggling enterprises) in order to fund their various 
projects.1 While the existence of such opportunism in and of itself is not terribly interesting--at 
least theoretically-- the way in which this new economic landscape is affecting local political 
arrangements is a heretofore little considered, yet highly consequential, development of the 
recent ‘migrant crisis’. Further, with the underlying drivers of irregular migration slated to 
accelerate (global inequality, environmental degradation, decreasing cost of movement, climate 
change, etc...) there exists an urgent need to understand the ways in which the contemporary ‘age 
of migration’ will impact some of the world’s most vulnerable and unstable regions. By 
exploring the effect of migration flows on conflict, as opposed to the other way around, it is 
hoped that this thesis project can contribute to this understanding and provide an updated 
accounting of the political economic landscapes of conflict zones where migrant smuggling 
serves as a central pillar.  
 
1 Fransje Molenaar and Floor El Kamouni Janssen, “Turning the tide: The politics of irregular migration in the Sahel 
and Libya,” Clingendael, February 2017, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2017/turning_the_tide/  
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In this effort, this thesis will focus on the case of Mali. As a country currently embroiled 
in a renewed round of conflict that dates back decades, Mali serves a useful experimental case 
study that allows us to compare previous outbreaks of conflict with the current one, then analyze 
the extent to which any different dynamics can be attributed to the recent rise of the migrant 
smuggling economy. 
This leads to the following research question: how has the emergence of the migrant 
smuggling industry beginning in 2011 changed the conflict dynamics in Mali? This will be 
supplemented and focused towards the following sub-question of why has the post 2012 political 
situation in Mali developed into such a protracted and complex conflict in comparison with the 
previous Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s? I argue that the emergence of migrant smuggling as a 
central economic pillar in Northern Mali has produced a more diversified and decentralized 
economic landscape, which in turn has led to a more diffused political environment in the form 
of increased factionalism amongst armed groups. I believe that such a dynamic sheds important 
light on the current conflict consuming the country, and carries significant explanatory weight in 
accounting for the increased complexity and protractedness of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion--a 
ethnic minority primarily located in the north of the country--in comparison with previous ones. 
Indeed, the most recent rebellion from 1990-1995 against the south was terminated relatively 
cleanly with a peace agreement that was stable for some period of time due to a system of state 
co-option of the tribal elites in the North. This system clearly broke down in 2012, and the type 
of peace process that was previously achieved has been elusive.  
This opening chapter will proceed to present the crucial dimensions of the current 
conflict in Mali, and highlight the economic drivers that act as the openings through which a 
political economic analysis of such a conflict can enter. In this way, this introduction will serve 
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as a primer not only to the analytical section that specifically focuses on the case of Mali’s 
protracted conflict, but also the ways in which political economic analyses can be put to use to 
understand the dynamics and drivers of conflict.  
 
The Case of Conflict in Mali 
On January 16 of 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
launched an offensive against Malian state forces that would quickly result in the group’s capture 
of most of the northern Malian urban centers and effective control over two thirds of Malian 
territory by April of the same year. Thus was the opening salvo of the Malian civil war that 
continues to embroil the impoverished and land-lacked Sahelian nation despite the intensive 
intervention of international and regional peacekeeping forces and repeated efforts to facilitate 
inclusive peace talks. These peace-keeping forces find themselves in a highly complex and 
dynamic conflict environment that makes discerning the real fault lines and battlefield 
configurations incredibly difficult; as Samake notes, “[d]ay after day, movements are created and 
dissolved according to the interests of certain people.”2 These movements, and the divisions 
between them, emerge and cohere along a number of ideological, social, ethnic, racial, and clan-
based axis that link the web of relations in the north of Mali.3 These diverse divisions also 
organize and structure the wider network of connections between forces in the north and Malian 
state, a relationship that has ranged from cooperative, co-optive, and conflictual depending on 
the groups in question. Regional connections are also vital to life in northern Mali, as colonial 
 
2 Yaya Samake, “Mali: Former MP Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh threatens to resume the maquis,” Maliactu, 
September 2016, http://maliactu.net/mali-situation-securitaire-au-nord-du-mali-lancien-depute-ibrahim-ag-mohamed-assaleh-
menace-de-reprendre-le-maquis/   
3 Nationalia, “Azawadi movements start second round of negotiations with Mali, seek "specific statute"” 
Nationalia.info, May, 2014,  
https://www.nationalia.info/new/10334/azawadi-movements-start-second-round-of-negotiations-with-mali-seek-specific-statute  
7 
borders have drawn lines between communities that exist on both sides and move quite freely. 
Nonetheless, these artificial barriers have proved to be fundamental structures of the socio-
economic life of Mali’s peripheral borderlands, as cross-border smuggling --in the form 
foodstuff, fuel, drugs, cigarettes, and people--have emerged as a central mode of reproduction for 
people in the unforgiving desert environment.  
The combination of cross-border communal ties and intense economic interdependence 
has contributed to the regionalization of the northern Mali conflict. In the case of Algeria, fears 
of spillover, especially from the image of a successful, viable independent Tuareg movement on 
their southern border could inspire in their own southern Tuareg minority, has led to an intense 
desire to shape events in both formal and informal ways. Aside from serving as an official 
international mediator between the government and rebel groups, Algiers has been suspected of 
being in no small part responsible for the existence of the jihadist strain that has infected the 
region, a flame that Jeremy Kennan claims was fanned by the Algerian intelligence services in 
order to undermine the position of Tuareg nobles, as well as a pretext to extract ‘terrorist rents’ 
from the international community. In addition, the direct intervention of France, and suspected 
financial links between Qatar and a number of Islamist militant groups in the north underscore 
regional, inter-regional, and international forces that vie to input their preferences into the 
extremely dynamic political and economic systems that are feeding Mali’s current conflict.  
 These external players are not the only elements responsible for the protracted nature of 
Mali’s conflict, as inspections at the domestic level reveal a kaleidoscope of local interests that 
have thus far resisted the type of political consolidation necessary to achieve a sustainable peace 
agreement. Indeed, repeated rounds of negotiations have quickly fallen apart under the 
centrifugal forces of rebel fragmentation and inept state implementation. What began as a unified 
8 
movement, the MNLA, now consists of eight officially recognized rebel organizations,4 and a 
number of smaller local militias that are primarily organized around the principle of community 
self-defense in the absence of state military protection.5 This of course is not to mention the 
existence of jihadi groups that are purportedly motivated by their desire to implement sharia 
based political and legal systems across the north and ultimately transform Malian society along 
Islamist lines.  
 Thus telling the story of the conflict in Mali is a perilous undertaking that is doomed to 
some degree of oversimplification. From the outside, one must choose from a number of 
alternative narratives as to what is actually going on in Mali. Some emphasize the broad-based 
grievances and underdevelopment in the north that are rooted in state neglect, if not complete 
absence, that have impelled the Tuareg minority and its allies to rise up and demand a more just 
arrangement between the north and south. Others highlight the role of ‘ethnic-military’ 
entrepreneurs in mobilizing these real grievances along ethnic or racial lines, and instrumentally 
directing them towards violence against the state in order to gain what can only be taken in times 
of war. In his analysis of the “Tuareg question,” namely why Mali’s history is plagued by an 
apparent cycle of Tuareg uprisings, Sardan notes:  
 
As is often the case for uprisings based on ethnicity, the ethnic-military entrepreneurs 
have above all been driven by their own interests, or those of their circle of adepts, 
jumping from one alliance to another, using their capacity to cause nuisance for their 
personal promotion, and settling into the chains of corruption and misappropriation that 
the “post-rebellion cash” has aroused. 6 
 
 
4  Ibrahim Maiga, “Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the labels,” Institute for Security Studies 17, 2016.  
5  Marc-Andre’ Boisvert, “Failing at Violence: The Longer-lasting Impact of Pro-government Militias in Northern 
Mali since 2012,” in African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 272-298. 
6 Jean Pierre- Olivier de Sardan, “‘The Tuareg question’ in Mali today,” LASDEL, December 2012. 
http://www.bu.edu/wara/files/2013/06/mali-the-Tuareg-question.pdf  p.36 
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This greed narrative is widespread, even amongst international mediators, with one 
African Union official lamenting in an unguarded moment, “of course it is not about [a lack of 
development] with these people. If it was, we wouldn’t have all of these different groups fighting 
for power in the north, they would be united in negotiating on behalf of the people of the north.”7 
Many are also not blind to the fact it is many of the same actors from the conflict in the 1990s 
that are once again at the center stage of fighting and peace negotiating. “It is the same 
groups...literally the same people!”8 In turn, these ‘ethnic-military entrepreneurs’ as Sardan 
would call them have a long and sordid history in the trans-Saharan smuggling economy, around 
which so much of the relations between a complicit state and northern elite revolved, especially 
since the conclusion of the rebellion of the 1990s.  
Thus, in the case of the current conflict in Mali, a political economic analysis of its 
dynamics seems not only viable, but increasingly vital to understanding its real drivers. These 
economic drivers appear to range from pure greed-based opportunism and violent protection of 
business interests, to structuring the opportunity structures through which the more ideologically 
or principally inclined actors are able to channel their grievances via access to funding resources. 
In this light, Mali appears enmeshed within a regional war economy of the type that will be 
described in chapter two; that is dynamic, adaptable, and characterized by a proliferating set of 
activities that are increasingly contested and conducted within a context of violence. This 
underscores the intractable political situation and elusiveness of any negotiations to enact real 
disarmament and demobilization. According to the same African Union official, the current 
conflict environment is not a hell in which the northern elites are withstanding in order to bring 
 
7 Personal Interview: MISAHEL, Bamako, March 2018. 
8 Ibid 
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about a needed political change, but for many of them, especially those who participate in the 
region’s thriving illicit economy, ‘this is their paradise.’9  
The story of the relationship between this illicit economy and the current conflict is a 
long one, but nonetheless necessary to present in order to understand the environment in which 
the migrant smuggling economy emerged. Indeed the arrival of increasing flows migrants in 
2014-2015 were channeled into smuggling networks that had been active for some time. The 
way in which the migrant smuggling industry has been integrated into the existing socio-political 
power structure of the region had great effects on how it has ultimately impacted the dynamics of 
the conflict. Therefore in order to illuminate these effects, this thesis will nest the role of migrant 
smuggling within this larger story.  
While such an analysis is plagued by issues of data collection that are endemic to areas of 
conflict and illicit forms of economic activity, this thesis attempts to provide some tentative 
conclusions that are beginning to emerge. Built upon extensive fieldwork conducted by others, as 
well as knowledge gained by the researcher throughout a visit to Bamako in March 2018, the 
evidence presented throughout is largely to result of interviews conducted by a diverse range of 
people from Malian government officials, staff members of international organization, and 
normal citizens. Triangulating from these range of inputs can help minimize the particular biases 
that different interviewees would present, and thus produce narratives and facts that one can be 
reasonably confident closely align with the historical reality. In addition, this data will be placed 
within a conceptual scaffolding that allows for more generalizable inductions regarding the ways 
in which the current conflict in Mali is representative of emerging trends in our contemporary 
conflict landscape.  
 
9 Ibid. 
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Towards this end, the following chapter will review the literature regarding the 
interaction of resources and economic activity and conflict. It will then move to propose a 
theoretical framework that can account for the ways in which the migrant smuggling economy is 
contributing to a more fragmented political landscape through the ability of disgruntled or 
marginalized actors to create and maintain and independent resource base. This will provide the 
theoretical guide posts through which conflict in Mali will be analyzed. Chapters 5 and 6 will 
compare the current conflict in Mali with the previous Tuareg rebellion from 1990-1995. This 
previous conflict not only provides the salient political context within which much of Mali’s 
subsequent politics took place, but also allows us to compare this conflict with the current one 
and highlight the features that set present situation apart. Indeed while many Malians view the 
current crisis as a re-iteration of a continual cycle of conflict between northern Tuareg and Arab 
tribes and the south, the country has never before seen a conflict as disastrous and politically 
complex as this one. 350,000 Malians were internally displaced with another 150,000 seeking 
refuge in neighboring countries, mostly in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.10 Many remain 
displaced and unable to return to their homes in the face of protracted instability, communal 
violence, and the inability to enact the type of inclusive peace accords that eventually brought 
peace in the 1990s.  
It will then move argue that understanding these changes in the conflict dynamics of Mali 
must be viewed in light of a transformation in the economic environment that occurred 
throughout the 2000s and through the run up of 2012. As the previous conflict was largely 
sustained by low value and non-replenishable resources (i.e.: petty theft of cattle and vehicles), 
the organizational structure of the rebel movements remained, though decentralized, relatively 
 
10 UNHCR, Mali Situation: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees as of 31 July 2017, July 2017. 
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coherent due to the fact that, as anthropologist Judith Scheele observed, tribal economies 
characterized by low value commodities tend to reinforce existing social bonds.11 In addition, the 
non-replenishable of these resources prevented the solidification of any schismatic movements 
before they could develop an independent and sustainable resource base. This in turn put the 
prevailing tribal leadership in a position to maintain the coherence of the various militant 
movements in the north to an extent that would no longer be possible by the outbreak of the 
conflict in 2012.   
Beginning with the arrival of Andean cocaine in the mid-2000s, changes within the illicit 
smuggling economy facilitated the emergence of new actors and the empowerment of those 
previously marginalized. Tracking these changes in the smuggling economy reveals how, like 
resources, this activity is subject to various typologies that produce different articulations 
depending on the types of goods (or people) that are being smuggled. Understanding the 
different structural necessities that different inputs create in smuggling networks must be 
accounted for in explaining the conflict dynamics in Mali, and the role that the emergence of the 
migrant smuggling industry has played. 
In short, this thesis will argue how evolutions in northern Mali’s illicit economy has 
produced a war economy unlike the previous one. This new war economy not only affected the 
capacities of the armed groups involved, but also their motivations and goals, evidenced by the 
qualitatively different demands made by the MNLA upon the state in 2012 (full succession, as 
opposed to autonomy). The story of this evolution is a salient case of the ways in which politics 
and economics interact in contemporary conflict environments, and by the 2014, it is a story that 
increasingly revealed the role that illicit human movement will play in these trends.  
 
11 Judith Scheele,“Tribus, etats et fraude: la région frontalière algéro-malienne,” Etudes Rurales 184, no. 2 (2009). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
As the post-Cold War era intensified the trend towards internal (as opposed to inter-state) 
conflict, the quest for a theoretical understanding of such violence took on a greater urgency. 
Challenging the traditional theoretical approaches towards organized political violence, these 
internal conflicts, or ‘new wars’ as they were called, were characterized by a blurring of the line 
between the state and non-state, the soldier and the criminal, the political and the economic, and 
even between war and peace.12 In his famous re-iteration of the military historian Otto Von 
Clausewitz's famous axiom that ‘war was a continuation of politics by other means’, David Keen 
observed that in an increasing number of cases war appeared to be continuation of economics by 
other means.13 Thus rather than simply tracking the various political grievance narratives that 
appeared to animate these conflicts, scholars began to look towards the deeper socio-economic 
factors that seemed to shape their dynamics. 
As this thesis is an effort to analyze the role of the migrant smuggling economy on the 
conflict in Mali, this section will review the literature pertaining to war economies and the 
manner in which resources and economic activities influence civil warfare. By considering and 
incorporating a number of criticisms that have been leveled at the ‘war economy’ model, I will 
contend that conceptualizing a more dynamic war-economy that is firmly entrenched in regional 
and global political economic system allows us to retain its usefulness as an analytical tool 
through which to analyze conflicts in an era of rapid globalization and market integration. 
 
12 Mark Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) 
13 David Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,”  in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil 
Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2000). 
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Indeed, more recent approaches towards conflict analysis, driven largely by the concern over the 
emergence of transnational criminal networks (a category in which human smuggling networks 
have been placed) and its nexus with terrorism, would do well to consider the surrounding 
political economic landscapes in which they operate. It will then move to review the budding 
literature pertaining to rebel decentralization and fragmentation that serves as an dependent 
variable of interest in this thesis, as well as a phenomenon that has attracted increasing attention. 
It will conclude with propositions of how dynamic war economies can influence the 
organizational makeup of conflict actors in preparation for chapter four, which sets out a more 
detailed theoretical framework on this relationship between resources and rebel structure.  
 
Greed, Grievance, and Opportunity Structures in Conflict Zones  
One of the landmark studies credited with directing the study of civil conflict towards 
economic variables came from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s large-N quantitative analysis of 
civil wars over the four-decade period from 1960 to 1999. They found that low GDP growth, 
high youth unemployment, low secondary school enrollments rates, and reliance on primary 
resource extraction were significantly correlated with the onset of civil war; while traditional 
political variables, such as high levels of inequality, lack of representative political institutions, 
and ethnic fractionalization were either marginally significant or not at all.14 These findings 
largely laid the groundwork for what came to be known as the “greed and grievance” debate 
within the civil war literature, in which the relative importance of economic (greed) and political 
(grievance) factors in accounting for certain conflict dynamics was explored. 
 
14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Policy Research Working Paper 2355, 
World Bank, Washington DC, 2001. 
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 Resistance to this economic approach to conflict analysis, and to the findings of the 
Collier and Hoeffler in particular, centered on the implied assertion that political grievances were 
not important or, as Collier wrote had asserted, acted as simple rhetorical tools used by rebel 
groups to justify what were essentially campaigns of private enrichment.15 The correlations 
between the abundance of valuable natural resources and a higher risk of conflict further 
upended earlier ideas that it was the scarcity of natural resources that led to civil conflict via 
increased grievance and economic desperation and thus seemed to undercut the legitimacy of 
rebel campaigns against tyrannical and oppressive third world regimes.  
 Much of the greed and grievance debate arises from the fact that ‘greed’ actually 
represents a slight misnomer, as the economic factors under analysis can proxy both for the 
material incentive to wage a rebellion (for personal enrichment) as well as the opportunity for its 
success (via sources of funding for rebel groups). Collier himself seemed to accept this nuance, 
by later referring to certain salient economic variables as ‘proxies for opportunity,’16 whilst 
dropping the ‘greed’ terminology. Thus much of the greed vs. grievance debate can wither away 
once it is recognized that they do not represent two dichotomous and competing explanatory 
approaches, but in fact two complementary components to a complex process that requires both 
motivations and opportunities to come to fruition (as rebellion in this case).  
This political economic approach towards conflict analysis simply highlights how an 
actor’s motivations and actions are constrained by certain opportunity structures that are largely 
derived from the surrounding material environment. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to come 
 
15 Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2000). 
16 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model on Civil War Onset and the 
Case Study Project Research Design,” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1, edited by Paul 
Collier and Nicholas Sambinis (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005); 3-8. 
16 
across a political system anywhere in the world that did not contain some ambient level of 
grievance or substantial inequality that some marginalized group would hope to upend; however 
the likelihood and manner that such grievance will be channeled into armed action depends on 
the means available. The Tuareg population in Northern Mali undoubtedly has a long-standing 
list of accumulated grievances with the Malian state in the South--a clear political fault line 
which has been punctuated by eruptions of violence over the past half century. While it would be 
quite an unwieldy analytical task, if not an impossible one, to disentangle these grievance 
motivations from the specific historical context of this population and this region, focusing rather 
on the material opportunity factors allows us to subject these conflicts, and all conflicts in 
general, to a broader and more ambitious research agenda as to the deeper dynamics of organized 
political violence. What makes these Tuareg rebellions distinctive, and what do they share with 
other instances of civil conflict can be determined by looking at the material structures under 
which they have taken place.  
 James Fearon likewise emphasized looking towards certain opportunity structures in 
explaining the onset and duration of civil wars. However, he contended that the correlation 
between low GDP, high unemployment, and low levels of youth enrolled in secondary education 
did not proxy the low opportunity costs associated with rebel recruitment (as Collier had 
theorized), but in fact were a reflection of state weakness and ineptitude--which in turn made 
armed insurgencies more feasible.17  
Further critiques have also questioned the applicability of the Collier Hoeffler model to 
many, if any, specific cases of conflict as the effects of these economic variables are bound to 
articulate differently across space and time. As Elnur notes, “[c]ivil wars are triggered by certain 
 
17 James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” in Journal of Peace Research, 
41:3 (2004), DOI 10.1177/0022343304043770 ISSN 0022-3433    
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variables (i.e. economic, social, political) at a specific historical context, in a given socio-
economic setting.”18 Where these triggering thresholds are, and the nature and severity of the 
conflict that subsequently emerges, is heavily conditioned by a host of intervening variables that 
cannot simply be sacrificed at the altar of parsimony. These economic variables often interact 
with the surrounding social, economic, and political context in often unpredictable and chaotic 
ways that renders any search for linear relationships difficult, if not entirely misguided. In order 
to produce a conception of conflict that is amenable to these non-linearities, scholars continued 
to apply the political economic approach to not only identify the types of opportunity structures, 
or the soft underbelly of a political system, where armed rebellion can arise, but to analyze 
certain dynamics of conflict that are firmly rooted in the surrounding historical and socio-
economic contexts.  
David Keen emphasized the need to view armed conflict not as “simply a breakdown in a 
particular system rather than as the emergence of an alternative system of profit, power, and even 
protection.”19.  Regardless of the relative causes of its inception, violent conflict has a way of 
generating certain opportunistic behaviors and power relations that are based firmly based in the 
distinctive ‘war economies’ that emerge in these conflict zones. The concept of a ‘war economy’ 
simply refers to the economic activities that sustain an area during wartime. As Goodhand later 
specified, the range of actors engaging in this war economy include the belligerent groups 
themselves, opportunistic entrepreneurs, and civilians attempting to seek out a livelihood in the 
difficult environs of a war-battered region.20  The activities can range from purely profit-
 
18 Ibrahim Elnur, “War and transformative potential:Toward and alternative conceptual framework for analysing 
post-civil wars,” in Contested Sudan: The political economy of war and reconstruction, (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 26. 
19 David Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 16. 
20 Jonathan Goodhand (2003) “From war economy to peace economy?” In: State reconstruction and international 
engagement in Afghanistan, Joint CSP/ZEF (Bonn) symposium, 30 May - 1 June 2003, Bonn, Germany 
18 
motivated capture of lootable resources or exploitation that are only possible in the relatively 
anarchical environment of a civil war, to the various means through which rebel groups and 
armed actors develop funding streams to fuel their war-fighting capacity. Between these points--
pure opportunism on the one hand and resourcefulness by armed groups or civilians on the other-
- exists a broad gray area that represents the aforementioned blurred lines between criminal and 
soldier, politics and economics, and war and peace. What regularly comes into focus, however, 
in the analysis of conflict zones is that their traditional image as anarchical and chaotic spaces 
characterized by mindless and irrational violence gives way to a coherent war economy with a 
distinct power structure and interest-matrix. 
The particular types of resources and economic activities that compose these war 
economies, as well as the way in which they are dispersed across the territory produce different 
conflict dynamics as they empower some groups over others and create new incentives for 
control over certain areas. For example, Ross found that oil, non-fuel minerals, and drugs to be 
correlated with longer war durations, likely due to the illicit smuggling trades that these 
resources are often associated with in times of conflict--particular in areas of weak or 
acquiescent state control. As types of resources, these commodities are characterized by their 
high value and strong demand on the global market, making them highly liquidable assets that 
rebel groups can easily manage to convert to much needed financing. This could be contrasted 
with renewable resources such as agricultural land, which produces much smaller dividends over 
longer periods of time. This fact makes renewable resources a much less valuable asset for 
belligerent groups consumed by the urgency of war-making, and also likely accounts for the lack 
19 
of correlation between agricultural resources and conflict dynamics (both likelihood of onset and 
duration).21  
In addition to the types of resources, the manner in which they are concentrated and 
distributed across the territory is also worthy of attention in analyzing relationship between 
resources and conflict. Le Billon presented a model that proposes that resources concentrated 
near areas of strong state control, such as a capital city, are more likely to encourage coup d’états 
or other forms of elite conflict, as opportunistic agents move to take control over the state and 
direct the resource rents towards themselves. On the other hand, resources concentrated in more 
peripheral areas are often associated with secessionist movements (such as oil in southern 
Nigeria) or a type of warlordism if the resource is decentralized and diffuse (one may think of 
Afghanistan and opium in this case).22   
 
The Globalized War Economy and Regionalized Conflict 
These two factors--the types of resources and their geographic spread--have their limits in 
accounting for the emergence of certain conflict dynamics and the composition of particular war 
economies. They present an image of a hermetically sealed conflict zone with a predetermined 
set of lootable resources that will set the parameters of the hostilities. Therefore the model fails 
to account for the ways in which local economic activities are embedded within larger regional 
and global forces that combine to produce modern conflict environments.23The economic and 
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technological features of the modernity, what Harvey dubbed the ‘compression of space-time,’24 
have intensified the linkages between groups and across regions, and elevated these linkages 
themselves to a place of fundamental importance to daily life. Rather than simply supplementing 
internal economic activity, trade and long-distance interchanges form the core of subsistence to 
an increasingly proportion of the world. This is especially true of borderlands where geographic, 
political, and economic structures create the incentives for transborder trade and smuggling by 
populations that often find themselves neglected by development initiatives centered around the 
core.  
This element of integration led scholars to not merely analyze the internal processes of 
conflict, but consider the regional military, economic, political, and social networks in which 
they are imbedded.25 Wallensteeen and Sollenberg presented the concept of the “regional conflict 
complex” after their quantitative analysis of the 103 conflicts from 1989 to 1997 found that over 
half them were substantially linked to conflicts in neighboring countries.26 The formal borders 
that separate these conflicts are porous enough to allow for transborder connections, but real 
enough to make such activity strategically viable. Price differentials of basic commodities, often 
caused by the structural adjustment policies or currency devaluations, create the incentives for 
transborder smuggling activity and parallel trading networks. The protective cover of sovereignty 
often allows combatants to seek refuge on the other side of a national border and outside the 
reach of state-backed forces. Rival leaders see opportunities in their neighbor’s instability, 
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sending resources across the border to influence the outcome of nearby civil conflicts, and 
transborder ethnic groups often provide crucial material and logistical support to their brethren 
engaged in liberation struggles in adjacent countries. These economic, military, political, and 
social links form the main conceptual framework that Rubin put forward for understanding how 
conflicts become regionalized, not in spite of their formal borders, but because of them. In this 
way, regionalization can be seen as an increasingly structural feature of contemporary conflict, 
as Rubin notes, “[c]onflicts are regional. Most of the conflicts that confront the international 
community are not intrastate, as is commonly said, but consist of networks of conflict situations 
that link entire regions…”27 
The regional networks that sustain these conflicts are often in turn linked to global 
networks.28 The ease of access to the external markets allows rebel groups to find ready buyers 
for their looted resources.29  Duffield observed that “political actors have been able to control 
local economies and realize their worth through the ability to forge new and flexible relations 
with liberalized global markets.”30 The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone demonstrates the 
regional and global networks that formed and sustained the conflict for over a decade. The RUF 
largely derived their viability from a diamond-based war economy that spanned the whole region 
and maintained a strong link the global diamond markets. These so called ‘conflict diamonds’ 
found consistent access to export outlets along the West African coastline--especially from 
Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Ghana; or were traded internally, often directly bartered for 
arms that were imported from outside the region. The broad extension of this economy was the 
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key to its adaptability and resilience. Regulatory crackdowns in one country would simply divert 
illicit resource flows elsewhere, while the loss of access to any particular port would simply 
increase business down the coastline. All the while political leaders such as Charles Taylor 
imposed a modicum of control by allocating military resources when and where needed in order 
to keep this prolific regional shadow economy operating, and used his extensive international 
commercial contacts to ensure access to global markets. Thus these war economies are sustained 
at multiple levels, with regional and global networks interacting to create dynamic and 
sophisticated structures of interchange that are very much an emergent product of contemporary 
globalization. The characteristics of the global economy as “internationally networked, 
expansive, and supremely adaptive,” are imbued into the local war economies and regional 
networks that are linked to it,31 often creating the conditions for complex and protracted 
conflicts.  
These regional and global linkages not only sustain the continuous and stable exploitation 
of resources within conflict zones, but also hold the key to ways in which these resources bases, 
and the conflict dynamics and emerge from them, evolve. Global demand for resources and the 
ease through which their value can be realized on the market is not a historically static given, but 
indeed changes over time. This would imply that conflict itself, and the particular resource and 
economic endowments that characterize any specific conflict zone, are constantly evolving in 
line with larger developments in the globalized economy. As Le Billon is keen to point out, 
“rather than simply being driven by need (resource scarcity) or greed (resource abundance), 
conflicts may be viewed as a historical product inseparable from the social construction and 
political economy of resources.”32  The regionalized conflict in West Africa was as much a 
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product of global demand for diamonds as anything else. This is not to overemphasize the extent 
to which actors were purely motivated by access to gem profits or personal enrichment, though 
we would certainly do no better to under-emphasis or neglect this dynamic all together. The 
essential takeaway is that access to global diamond markets served as the permissive opportunity 
structure through which the RUF and other combatants were able to channel their aims, and this 
structure is composed of global and regional economic forces that are capable of transforming 
and re-making it in response to global changes in price, regulatory controls, and competition. 
 
Beyond Resource Reductionism 
Understanding how war economies emerge, regionalize, and change is also limited by a 
myopic focus on the illicit and parallel trade in commodities. This is not to say that the 
disproportionate attention to paid to natural resources is not somewhat justified. As Collier’s data 
showed, countries with an economic reliance on natural resources are particularly prone to civil 
war, as this reliance is at once a cause and consequence of the type political and economic 
underdevelopment that fosters the conditions for conflict. Aside from a simple reflection of state 
weakness, the availability of lootable natural resources do prove to be an exceptionally strong 
competitive boost to armed groups that successfully capture them. The relatively low costs of 
extraction, often just a matter of labor (such that can usually be hyper exploited from the local 
population), ease of transport, and high payoffs make natural resources a consistent stream of 
easy revenues for actors that have little time or capital to devote to creating productive industries 
capable of sustaining their war-fighting capacities. The RUF’s presence in the diamond mines of 
Sierra Leone, the Taliban’s control over lands that produced that ultimately account for 90% of 
the world’s heroin production, or even ISIS’ capture of the Levantine oil fields, extractive 
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equipment in-tact and all, had immediate consequences to these conflicts and directly drove their 
dynamics in very obvious and visible ways. 
Despite the fundamental role that natural resource played in these conflicts, and continue 
to play across contemporary conflict generally, the exclusive focus on certain primary 
commodities in the creation of war economies is neglectful of other crucial drivers of conflict. 
This may at some level be a result of institutional and analytical biases that tend towards 
illuminating the brightest and most romantic connections and relations, such as the rebel-held 
diamond mine, or jihadi-run oil field; or the fixation on the simplest and thus most amenable 
conflict drivers. Indeed, these conflict resources often make their way to Western markets, 
opening up clear lines of leverage for the international community to decrease demand and thus 
shape the dynamics of the conflict in ways that no amount of humanitarian aid or military 
intervention ever could. However, the almost exclusive focus on natural resources fails to 
register the effects of other forms of economic activity that nonetheless play a crucial role in an 
area’s political economic life. Nicola Palmer critiqued this legacy of ‘resource reductionism’ in 
her analysis of the ‘non resource-based war economy’ in Sri Lanka and the way in which 
remittances, taxation by Tamil militant groups along checkpoints in their territory, and other 
rents extracted from the state and donor community have influenced the conflict.33  
Expanding the focus from natural resources to encompass all forms of salient economic 
activity allows for a fuller understanding of the political economic landscape of a particular 
conflict zone, in particular ones that are relatively scarce in natural resources--such as Sri Lanka 
and Northern Mali. This expanded focus in turn widens the applicability of the war economy 
model, in so much as it provides a framework for understanding the salient economic factors at 
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play in various conflicts that do not fit the traditional models of ‘resource wars.’ As Palmer 
notes, conceptualizing a “‘non resource based war economy’ allows us to understand the 
“complex set of economic motivations that constitutes part of the reason why conflicts like Sri 
Lanka’s remain intractable,”34. The seeming lack of an animating role for natural resources in 
such a conflict has caused much of the analysis to default to purely grievance based approaches 
as the “greed” dynamic seems to not apply. However what Palmers contends is that economic 
means through which belligerent actors fund their activities is relevant in explaining certain 
dynamics of the conflict (protractedness in this case) --regardless of whether these funds are 
derived from natural resources or other economic activities.  
Whether it is the transnational diaspora fund-raising, taxation along inter-regional transit 
routes, or the direct smuggling of commodities or people, these activities materialize due to the 
political and economic structures that emerge from borders and differential regulatory regimes. 
This gives them a decidedly regional component. They rely on a set of regionalized networks for 
their existence, networks that they in turn feed and perpetuate--representing an emergent 
contradiction in contemporary border and regulatory regimes that create industries that are then 
declared an existential threat to the formal political order. Interest in such activity has also been 
reflected in the emerging literature on ‘new regionalism’ in IR which seeks to elevate the role of 
non-state actors in directing regional economic flows and political processes. According to 
Fawn, “if we anticipate regionalism to start with and/or be predominantly economic, we may 
well find the substate, trans-national and private economic interests that some have identified 
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now as major forces for regionalism and integration...Regionalism, broadly construed, can also 
be said to exist through transitional connections forged by criminal activities.”35  
These transnational economic connections play an essential role in the creation of 
regional conflict complexes. The more entrenched and diversified these networks, the more 
protracted that conflicts they sustain tend to be. Modern communication, banking, and navigation 
technology create the conditions for flexible and resilient shadow economies that emerge within 
and across crevices in formal regulation institutions. New industries emerge and existing ones 
expand as they are fostered by a regional and global economic conditions that have significantly 
lowered the costs of doing illicit business across vast territories. Local economies become 
enmeshed within regional trading networks while the modern-day merchant is capable of running 
scaled up operations with relatively little initial investment. These regional networks become 
linked with others as demand swings or new supply discoveries will divert resources with an 
increasing imperviousness towards distance. The involvement of Lebanese traders in Sierra 
Leone’s shadow diamond industry, the role that these profits later played in funding Lebanon’s 
civil war demonstrates the extent to which regionalized conflict economies are not only 
internally integrated, but also increasingly linked with each other.36  
Non-resource based exchange relations are salient in this process of change and 
expansion as they are less tied to place and more adaptable to changing economic and political 
circumstances. Thus analyses of the non-primary sectors of various war economies is crucial to 
understand how they emerge, adapt, expand, and hopefully transform eventually into peace 
economies. The migrant smuggling economy in Mali has undoubtedly had a significant impact 
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on the the local war economy, as well served to link this conflict to regional and global networks. 
Analysis of the local effects of this economic activity must therefore keep this larger context in 
view, and in doing so may shed light on the ways that emergent industries and geopolitical 
shocks, such as a wave of refugee flows, can transform war economies, create new regional 
conflict complexes, and link areas in fundamentally different ways.  
In addition, as countries develop and diversify their economies, the means through which 
political and economic power is distributed and contested will increasingly take place around 
non-resource based economic activity. This has been apparent in parallel commodity smuggling 
economies that sustained war economies in the former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, and is 
especially salient in resource poor areas such as Northern Mali where local power dynamics are 
largely derived by control over smuggling routes.  
Finally, the effect of climate change is sure to accentuate the relations between changing 
resource bases and conflict dynamics. This may not only occur along the lines of increasing 
competition over scarce resources, a dynamic more akin to traditional ‘resource wars,’ but also 
competition over resources that climate change is making more abundant, such as 
environmentally-displaced migrants or ‘climate refugees’ fleeing towards the Global North. 
These ‘new abundances’ will inject new sources of contestation amongst vying groups, and may 
grant competitive advantage to to actors most capable of capitalizing on the windfalls that 
emerge in times of acute crisis and change (those engaged in human smuggling, in this case.) 
 
A Return to a Political Economic Approach 
Much of the recent scholarly and policy work on smuggling enterprises has followed a 
narrative of criminality and focused on the security threats presented by transnational criminal 
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organizations (TCOs). Indeed, the rise of migrant smuggling has been placed within a wider 
literature that identifies illicit smuggling of all types; in particular drugs and weapons, as 
emerging global security threats that erode local state authority and provides fertile ground for 
extremist groups to take hold.37  This organized crime- state fragility nexus has played heavily in 
assessing the contemporary conflict dynamics of the Sahara-Sahel region, as well as  additional 
Central and South America, and, perhaps most prominently, Afghanistan and the prolific opium 
trade. By focusing on issues of criminality, licit vs. illicit, state vs. non-state, this contemporary 
focus has again reified these political and economic factors as essentially dichotomous forces, as 
opposed to amounting to two ends of a continuous spectrum along which the complicated 
vagaries of modern conflict are manifested. Thus by moving away from the war economy model 
which sought to illuminate these vagaries, the recent work on conflict, to the extent that 
organized crime has taken on a central focus, has returned to the state-centric militaristic 
approach that has proven to be an unwieldy tool in comprehending the deeper social, political, 
and economic dynamics of modern conflict. In short, recent work on conflict has focused on the 
manifestations of underlying conditions, rather than these underlying conditions themselves. 
Combating transnational criminal organizations, drug gangs, illicit arms dealers, and criminally 
linked militia groups will be much like a game of whack-a-mole so long as the underlying 
political and economic conditions that foster their emergence and resilience are not accounted 
for.  
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Today, perhaps more than ever before, civil conflict as taking place along a diversified 
and proliferated set of spectrums and axis that are derived to a large extent from the local 
material environment. Globalization and the transnationalization of economic networks has not 
minimized the importance of local war economies, as the conflict dynamics they produce are 
indeed manifested locally. All transnational networks and enterprises that garner much of the 
interest in recent organized crime-oriented conflict research have local articulations that become 
embedded in the political economic fabric of a particular area. These operations remain reliant 
on local sources of labor and knowledge as they pass through various territories, leaving a stream 
of revenues as they traverse their transnational landscape. It is these latter articulations and local 
effects that can come to comprise a key pillar of the war economy of a conflict zone, such is the 
case of the transnational smuggling networks in Northern Mali. As a dynamic and regionalized 
war economy, the migrant smuggling economy has entered Mali and reshaped the political 
economic landscape in a way that has changed the existing power arrangements and opportunity 
structures under which the most recent conflict is taking place. While Tuareg rebellion in the 
1990s was characterized by a degree of factionalism and diffused rebel organization, these 
divisions were limited and kept within the parameters of what was still, in essence, a separatist 
campaign targeted towards specific political demands against the state.38 In contrast, the current 
conflict-- which kicked off in 2012 with the thunderous advance of Tuareg militants towards the 
South--has developed beyond a traditional separatist conflict organized along ethnic lines to 
include a broader array of actors-- from other local ethnic communities to Islamic extremist 
groups-- with a dizzying matrix of shifting hierarchies, allegiances, and purported goals.39  
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Accounting for this shift in conflict dynamics, namely an increase in rebel 
decentralization, is crucial for understanding the current state of conflict in Mali and why it has 
taken on a degree of complexity and protractedness in comparison with the past. Indeed, the 
‘problem’ of fragmented insurgencies and decentralized militant movements have drawn the 
attention conflict researchers more generally, as they are increasingly associated with prolonged 
conflicts that are difficult to resolve by traditional military or political means. The following 
section will review the current research pertaining to rebel cohesion, in particular how the 
material environment intersects with rebel organizations to create pressures of either 
centralization or decentralization.  
 
Decentralization and fragmentation 
 The presence of fragmented insurgencies and decentralized rebel movements have been 
identified as a key impediment to any movement towards a peace process.40 Traditional warfare, 
wherein two hierarchical organizations competing over conflicting political aims, would often 
terminate when one side realized the futility of continuing or both sides came to a mutual 
agreement to cease their operations. In either case, the strategic goals and tactical decisions were 
made within a largely centralized decision-making structure with sufficient degree of control 
over the organization to mobilize collective action. Increasingly however the world has 
witnessed an increase in conflicts that are characterized by decentralization, with combatant 
groups more accurately described as networks than hierarchies, and the consequent blurring of 
many of the conceptual lines that defined the ‘old wars.’ For instance, Kathleen Gallagher has 
compiled a dataset which shows that merely 10% of nationalist opposition movements between 
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1960- 2005 were able to maintain cohesion and resist fragmentation, a fact that she demonstrated 
to be strongly correlated with an increase in civil war onset.41   
Contemporary conflicts additionally demonstrate the degree to which fragmented 
oppositions create longer and more violent conflicts. Writing in the Washington Post recently, 
Bakke et al. lamented: 
Events in Syria reflect the wider fragmentation of Middle Eastern states and societies, as 
evidenced by ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. A prominent feature of 
these conflicts is the inability of movements to remain united, both during and after civil 
wars. In Syria, the opposition has fragmented repeatedly – and more recently, so have the 
various forces aligned with the government. Militias have proliferated in Iraq, 
compounding the country’s already fractured politics. In Libya, fighting among the 
various factions has divided the country into rival camps and provides a telling example 
of how tenuous the unity of armed groups can be. In Yemen, an unlikely series of 
alliances has seen yesterday’s foes become today’s friends as political order has 
fragmented across the country’s divided regions and in the capital of Sanaa. These 
examples are not exceptional.42 
 
 In such an environment peace talks become more difficult, if they occur at all, as more 
opposition actors insist a seat at the table to push their conflicting demands in exchange for a 
cessation of hostile activities that they may or may not be able to actually impose on their rank 
and file. Nationalist groups splinter into a wide web groups, some of which only separated by 
differences of strategy or tactics, while others develop into something else entirely with aims that 
that border on the cosmological. This complex web is most apparent in place such as Syria, 
Libya, and Mali, where secular opposition groups and global jihadi groups often find side by side 
against the state; at times cooperating while in others turning their guns towards each other.  
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Thus delving into the internal politics of non-state actors and peering beneath the ‘unitary 
actor’ fallacy has become a task of immense interest to conflict researchers and policy makers 
alike. To the extent that decentralized and fragmented opposition movements create the 
conditions for protracted civil conflicts, understanding when, why, and how such fragmentation 
takes place are questions of imminent urgency. In addition, as Gallagher’s dataset revealed and 
current conflicts are displaying with tragic clarity, decentralization appears to be a fundamental 
trait of contemporary conflict.43 Therefore theories of rebel fragmentation must present causal 
factors that are generally widespread and operative across a range of regions and political 
contexts. Extremely contextual and specific explanations for a phenomenon that has affected 
over 90% of opposition groups over the past half century simply will not do, insofar as they fail 
to illuminate general and global pressures that could account for what appears to be a general and 
global trend.  
Scholars have generally agreed that their access to resources is a crucial component to a 
rebel group’s behavior and organization, though there is disagreement as to the precise role 
resources play and whether they general promote cohesion or fragmentation. Weinstein was one 
of the first to present a theory of insurgent behaviors and is considered one of the most 
industrious attempts at analyzing the inner workings of non-state groups as actors in their own 
right as opposed to shadowy, ill-defined, and poorly understood sources of ‘opposition’. He 
argued that the behavior of insurgent groups, and their relations with the surrounding population, 
is significantly derived from their resource base. Groups that derive most of their revenues from 
natural resources or external sponsorship develop traditional rentier economies across the 
territories they control, and thus behave with higher levels of violence and barbarism towards 
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civilian populations as command structures break down and banditry abounds. On the other 
hand, groups that are less reliant on such rents must develop more social capital with the wider 
population in order to derive consistent revenues and local support, leading to less barbaric 
behavior and stronger ties both within the organization and between the organization and the 
wider community.44 
Weinstein’s theoretical contention that resources infect militant groups with the dreaded 
resource curse is contrasted with other analyses that show resources can actually promote 
cohesion. For instance, Tamm’s analysis of the configuration of alliances in the Congolese wars 
showed how external state sponsorship could promote rebel cohesion when directed towards 
supporting the existing leadership, while at other times encouraging fragmentation when 
provided to schismatic weak points within an organization.45 Staniland summed up the impasse 
in the literature: 
  
It is hard to square this circle: resource wealth on its own is associated with both 
undisciplined fragmentation and disciplined organization building. Monocausal 
explanations that link resource flows to patterns of organizational form and behavior can 
offer valuable insights into particular cases, but they are insufficient when considered in 
comparative perspective.46  
 
He proposed as social institutional model that identifies pre-existing social cohesion as 
the key variable for whether insurgencies fragment or cohere as they gain access to resources. He 
argues that in instance of an injection of resources, whether a capture of territory with valuable 
resources or any form of sponsorship, groups with existing structural fault lines within their 
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social, ethnic, or ideological composition will fall victim to a type of resource curse that 
promotes in-fighting, intra-group competition, and ultimately fragmentation. On the contrary, 
groups that are socially and ethnically cohesive from the outset are generally empowered by the 
injection of resources and are able to efficiently allocate them throughout their organization and 
increase their war-fighting capacity.47   
Staniland’s model presents a generalizable framework to account for why resource 
abundance produces varying effects across different rebel organizations. However, his 
conclusion that, “discipline and control are functions not of resource endowments, but instead of 
the ability of insurgent social networks and organizations to harness resources,”48 borders on the 
tautological, and fails to fully consider the fact ‘resources’ themselves, like ‘opposition groups’, 
are not a unitary category. Asking if more resources make groups more or less 
cohesive/fragmented is like asking if more food makes one more or less healthy. The question 
lacks the necessary precision to produce any useful answer. Different resources produce different 
effects depending on the types of resources they are. 
Resources are a broad and diverse category that require different institutional structures 
to be harnessed. Some require high levels of central control and organizational discipline, while 
others are easily lootable and liquidible, making them prone to exploitation by any number of 
opportunistic or ambitious actors without the need to go through the central nodes of the 
hierarchy. With this in mind, Staniland did compare cases with “identical resource profiles” that 
nonetheless exhibit variation in group cohesion.49 However, to the extent that fragmentation is an 
increasing feature of contemporary conflicts, variations in the social composition of rebel groups 
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fails to fully account for this trend. Granted, rebel groups are not blank slate actors, and they 
certainly emerge as militant groups with their own unique set of social, cultural, and ideological 
characteristics that play a part in determining their makeup and behavior. While such antecedent 
characteristics are vital to incorporate into any analysis of a specific case, one would have to 
presume that social diversity is increasing globally to account for the general state of 
fragmentation across nearly all conflicts. 
In addition, determining the degree to which a rebel group is predisposed towards 
cohesion can lead to a number of selection biases and selective descriptions. All successful rebel 
movements, and social movements in general, exist as collections of coalitions that are able to 
collectively push forward towards an agreed upon goal despite their underlying differences. One 
way of arriving at the myopic ‘unitary actor’ conception is the tendency to ignore these 
underlying differences and schismatic weak points that exist within all organizations, and 
mistake their ability to paper over these differences as evidence that these differences simply 
never existed in the first place. This perhaps led Staniland to reify ascriptive differences in 
fragmented groups, while ignoring them in seemingly cohesive ones.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the relationship between resources and rebel fragmentation remains an open yet 
urgent field of inquiry. Establishing what type of conflict landscape emerges out of the 
interaction of resources and the political and social institutions that stitch together rebel 
organizations requires a firm and theoretically grounded understanding of both the inputs 
(resources) and the a priori institutions that they animate. Existing literature produces 
contradictory conclusions regarding the effect of resources and on rebel cohesion, while attempts 
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to ‘square this circle’ place an undue weight on social factors that themselves are intimately 
entwined with the surrounding material environment.  
In a regionally networked and dynamic war economy, new modes of economic activity 
often enter conflict zones and disrupt existing social relations. The remaking of these social 
relations will manifest themselves in the region’s politics in ways that can fundamentally alter 
the dynamics of exiting conflicts, or create new ones that proceed along new lines. This 
proposition will be tested in the case of the migrant smuggling economy and the changing nature 
of conflict in Mali, specifically if the increase in fragmentation can be explained simply by 
changes in the social composition of northern Mali, social changes that themselves predated the 
changing economic landscape. To the extent that his is not true, it would appear that the 
changing nature of Mali’s war economy, and the resource profile that characterizes it, would be a 
crucial part of the story.  
In addition, the existing literature spends little time differentiating between different 
types of resources. Acknowledging that ‘resources’ are a category as diverse as ‘medicine’, is 
crucial to discerning any specific effect that any one resource or mode of economic activity is 
having on a conflict zone. Indeed, resources that form the dominant mode of economic activity 
in a conflict zone do not simply flow into rebel organizations and produce linear effects, but they 
re-make the entire political economic structure around it. Understanding the structural changes 
that such economies produce is the lens through discerning how any particular resource, migrant 
flows for instance, are affecting a region’s conflict dynamics.  
The following section will propose a theoretical framework for how different types of 
resources alter the structures of a conflict’s war economy, and thus place varying pressures on 
organizations for which they act as inputs. As a point of comparison, it will discuss the narco-
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economy of Colombia and Afghanistan, then will specifically focus on the case of migrant 
smuggling and outline how these networks produce decentralization--and ultimately defection--
pressures on the political systems with which they interact.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Several conceptual frameworks have emerged that attempt to lay a theoretical 
groundwork for analyzing the mechanisms behind insurgent fragmentation. As noted above, the 
essential organizational framework of a particular organization could be read quite differently by 
different analysts; indeed, as Zech and Gabbay note, “the FARC has been contrastingly depicted 
as a decentralized “network” [...] and as a hierarchical “army”.50 Nonetheless, many concepts, 
largely borrowed from organizational theory and network science, have created some 
opportunities for forward progress. This chapter will discuss these frameworks as they attempt to 
grapple with a number of issues that must be addressed in the study of the organizational makeup 
of non-state militant groups. It will begin with issues of classification and the attributes that are 
general associated with either hierarchical or networked insurgent groups, before moving to the 
exogenous factors that contribute to the formation of these respective organizational types. It will 
then explore how a theoretical model that focuses on the ability of actors to accumulate resources 
independent of the existing organizational leadership structure creates or limits the opportunities 
for defection and ultimately group fragmentation. A running comparative thread will be drawn 
with the narco-economies in Colombia and Afghanistan, a primary topic of interest to scholars 
interested in the relationship between resources and conflict dynamics. It will propose an 
alternative theoretical explanation, focusing on the above mentioned mechanism, for the relative 
degree of cohesion that both the FARC and Taliban have maintained. 
 
50 Steven T Zech and Michael Gabbay, “Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Insurgency: From 
Organization to Politics,” International Studies Review 18, no. 2 (2016): 231.  
39 
Finally, the concluding section will move to contrast the structural features of a narco-
dominated war economy with the case of Mali, and propose the mechanisms through which the 
migrant smuggling industry has created a war economy particularly conducive to defection and 
fragmentation. 
 
Hierarchies and Networks 
In order to navigate this analytical landscape with due deference to the complexity and 
gray zones that resist precise classification, Gutieirrez and Giustozzi place militant groups 
somewhere along a spectrum between army and network, with each end representing hierarchical 
and networked organizations, respectively.51 In their comparative analysis between the FARC in 
Colombia and the Afghan Taliban, they describe two groups that fall within different places 
along this organizational spectrum. They describe the Taliban as an insurgent group that is 
representative of an organizational structure closer to the network end of the spectrum. As such, 
they have traditionally maintained a strong social base and decentralized leadership structure that 
delegates a good deal of authority and strategic decision making to their field commanders. 
These essential qualities represent the trade-offs that occur as a groups moves along this 
spectrum from hierarchy to network: namely, as they decentralize they attain a stronger base of 
social support and thus resilience, but lose some capacity to coordinate collective action and 
begin to encounter principal-agent problems between leaders and subordinates.52 The FARC on 
the other hand, as a more hierarchical organization, is much more accurately conceptualized as a 
traditional army capable or coordinating action and defined by a very clear vertical line of 
 
51 Francisco Gutierrez Sanin and Antonio Giustozzi, “Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and 
Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 836-853. 
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authority and control from the top on down, yet plagued by a “very brittle and fragmented 
support base.”53  
By applying these empirical cases to their army-network framework, they conclude that 
‘organizational specificity’ not only illuminates certain general characteristics of insurgent 
groups  (social support base, coordination capability, leadership control, etc..) but also the range 
of factors that contribute to the historical development of such organizational features. In 
accounting for this development, they maintain that the organizational specificity of any 
insurgent group is: 
 
(a) a result of a co-evolutionary process; (b) not reducible; (c) prone to produce path 
dependency. It is a product of co-evolution, in the sense that armed groups develop their 
practices and thumb rules in response to hard evolutionary pressures, coming both from 
economic and other (human resource–based, for example) constraints, and from the 
strategies of their adversaries (for example, armies and counterinsurgencies).54 
 
Despite this non-reducibility, analysis of the exogenous factors that impact the 
development of certain organizational types, particularly the ‘hard evolutionary pressures’, is 
possible. For instance, the authors suggest some type of correlation between organizational 
structure and a group’s funding base. In the case of the more centralized FARC,  
 
there are credible evidences that since the 1990s it started to develop vertical integration, 
actively engaging in the protection of crops, the processing of the product, and its 
exportation...This contrasts with the highly decentralized Taliban modus operandi where, 
although in principle the fund-raising effort is subjected to the supervision of the 
leadership, and contributions are collected by specially appointed representatives, field 
commanders collect money too, particularly harvest tax. For practical reasons, it would 
require excessive human resources to appoint civilian cadres to collect dispersed revenue 
like this…”55 
 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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Unpacking this correlation between the group’s respective organizational forms and their 
mode of interaction with the surrounding resource base is difficult, as there are certainly 
elements of endogeneity and a host of intervening factors. The role of the Taliban’s pious 
ideology certainly has played a role in their hesitance to become as directly involved in the 
narco-economy as FARC, preferring instead to extract revenues indirectly and thus retain some 
semblance of distance.56 Indeed, this indicates that that organizational specificity is non reducible 
to resources or solely economic factors, though determining the extent to which these factors do 
create certain organizational pressures is possible by conceptualizing the role they play is 
determining the costs structures that act upon rebel groups.  
 
Decentralization and Defection 
Patrick Johnston directed attention towards such costs by mobilizing a principal agent 
framework in his analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia. He presented evidence regarding the 
impact of geography and technology on the insurgent organization, particularly the ways in 
which they increased or decreased the costs of governance and defection that are endemic to 
geographic expansion. Borrowing from the literature on corporate organization, he again 
conceptualizes insurgencies in two organizational forms, centralized and non-centralized.57 He 
posited that as insurgencies expand and capture more territory, they are pressured to delegate 
more authority to sub-commanders who are charged with controlling and maintaining their 
growing territorial base.58 In essence, expansion raises governance costs, which leads to 
delegation and decentralization. This in turn decreases the cost of defection from the point of 
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view of these sub-commanders or other agents, as such acts are difficult to detect and even more 
difficult to punish given the distance. This can be mitigated however by access to 
communications and information technology that allows the leadership to maintain close 
monitoring of their subordinates and ensure a regular flow of information from top to bottom, 
and vice versa. This effectively reduces the governance costs associated with expansion on the 
part of leadership, and maintains the cost of defection on the part of subordinates as the 
leadership is in effect hovering much closer than would otherwise be the case.  
Attaining breathing room from an organization’s leadership is one permissive cause that 
can allow subordinates to act independently. However, in order to be able to fully defect and 
mobilize an alternative support base that can eventually form a splintering faction, such 
divergent actors must have the means to support themselves and their budding sub-movements 
independent of any patronage ties with the main organization. This is the point where resources 
and economic landscapes come in. Fragmentation occurs precisely because divergent actors have 
both the breathing space from above and the material base from below in order to successfully 
defect and embark on their own independent action. The extent to which the economic landscape 
from which the organization extracts revenues is centralized, whether in hierarchical form or 
horizontally integrated around a central and essential node (presumably the existing rebel 
leadership), will determine the ease through with divergent actors can develop their own funding 
activities without the need to answer to or even cooperate with the leadership. 
Even decentralized networks can maintain a strong degree of cohesion that is in no small 
part due to the integrated economic landscape that they operate in. In the case of the Taliban, 
they were able to maintain cohesion and minimize defection despite the broad geographic spread 
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and decentralized economic landscape.59 Conceiving of a model in which the ability to derive 
resources independently of any overarching hierarchy or integrated network is essential for 
defection could account for this resilience of the Taliban’s coherence by recognizing that the 
narco-economy of Afghanistan was, while decentralized, highly integrated in the sense that it 
relied on mutual and sustained coordination between a range of actors.  
Here it is important to posit that despite the fact that networks and hierarchies are often 
presented as opposite forms with a set of attendant characteristics that differentiate their 
inclination towards either cohesion or defection, in fact, in these matters certain networks may 
resemble certain characteristics of more hierarchical organizations. This can be demonstrated by 
reference to concepts from network science and the emerging field of social network analysis in 
the study of insurgent groups. Indeed since, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the 
elevation of global jihadi ‘networks’ on the list of security threats facing states, how these 
networks operate and organize themselves, as well as the behavioral implications for these 
organizational configurations has been an area of intense scholarly and policy interest.60 
At the basic level, networks are simply “system of interconnected actors” that are 
connected through ties of “kinship, friendship, personal contact, interaction, shared experiences, 
or other forms of relations.”61 While the difficulties of establishing the nature, strength, and 
totality of these ties, as well as the borders of any interconnected network have always nagged 
scholars and counter-terrorism analysts, mapping out these networks can reveal quite a lot about 
the key nodes that keep the organization operating. The centrality of a node, observed by the 
number of ties connecting it to other nodes in the network (itself likely revealed through 
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intelligence intercepts, personal correspondences, or mentions made in public addresses), can 
reveal the operational leadership of a network, and thus identify targets whose elimination could 
significantly disrupt it. Other measures, such as ‘betweenness’ which identifies the degree to 
which one node is essential for connecting and transmitting information to others, and 
“closeness” which tracks for the speed and ease through which such information can be 
transmitted, help in creating an inner map of organizations that were previously considered too 
decentralized and opaque to analyze with a fine grain.62 
What such analyses, and the concepts that enable them, also reveal is that networked 
forms of organization exhibit a great deal of variation regarding their degree of interconnectivity, 
centrality, and transmission processes. Networks can be more or less integrated and centralized, 
with has implications regarding their cohesion and the ability of any given node to operate 
independently of the others. In this way, highly centralized and integrated networks can exhibit 
some similarities with hierarchies in the sense of maintaining the overall cohesion of the group, 
as a key common characteristic of both organizational types is each node’s reliance on the others 
to perform their roles within the system. Whether these nodal ties are oriented vertically, as in 
hierarchies, or horizontally in the case of networks, each node is heavily embedded within a 
sophisticated system that directs action in particular directions (through certain ties) and limits 
the ability of any given node to act independently. Thus both hierarchies and integrated networks 
represent structures that promote collective action and provide little incentive or ability for any 
individual node to break off; that is, to defect.  
In this light, decentralization does not necessarily denote a lack cohesion or the 
conditions for defection. It is possible to conceptualize of networks that are integrated and 
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cohesive despite their decentralization. The question becomes under what conditions do 
networks fragment as they decentralize, and when do they maintain their internal integration and 
cohesion? This thesis posits that the material environment, or economic landscape, that sustains 
the organization is a crucial factor. As Johnston’s theory would predict, the Taliban decentralized 
their operations and leadership structure as they expanded their territory; however, it was the 
economic environment that was not conducive to opportunistic actors to acquire the material 
means to pursue divergent interests. Looking at the nature of narco-economy that was a crucial 
source of Taliban revenues, it comprised of an integrated network of powerful and entrenched 
regional interests. The Taliban’s role in this economy was essential in “managing key issues 
where the [interests of] traders, smugglers, clerics and agrarian elites converge.”63 The Taliban 
has relied on these actors (and vice versa) in maintaining this multi-billion dollar illicit economy 
that has formed a central pillar in the regional war economy.  
The integration of this economy is a necessary condition for the operation of this 
industry; as growers, smugglers and dealers are entwined in relationships that require a high 
degree of coordination throughout the entirety of the production and distribution process in order 
to evade international policing efforts and clandestinely enter global markets. In such as system, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for any actor to derive significant revenues while cutting 
off ties with other nodes up or downstream. These ties are crucial to the realization of the 
resource’s value, as well as key to coordinating the political conditions necessary for the illicit 
industry to thrive.  
These features imply that narco-economies are prone to higher degrees of centralization, 
whether in the form of vertical hierarchies as reflected in FARC’s organizational structure, or 
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integrated networks in the case of the Taliban. In addition, by recognizing that traditional 
perceptions of decentralization as being synonymous with a lack of cohesion and tendency 
towards fragmentation, the aforementioned challenges regarding the classification of armed 
organization, such as the disagreement over whether FARC should be classified as a hierarchical 
army or decentralized network, can be partly papered over. The central element of interest in this 
case is cohesion, and the common resource profiles of both Colombia and Afghanistan that 
curiously produced variance in organizational structure, in fact produced similar outcomes 
regarding cohesion. In neither case were actors with divergent interests able to acquire the 
necessary material means to fully break with the mother organization, even when, in the case of 
the Taliban, the requisite breathing space from above was there as a result of geographic 
expansion. Acquiring or intercepting a shipment of narcotics as they moved through the region is 
not necessarily a boon for any independently inclined actor with a mind towards branching off, 
as the product must be transferred through other nodes within the system in order to realize any 
value. The reliance on these nodes, themselves possibly maintaining loyalty ties with the existing 
leadership, significantly constricts windows of opportunity for independent action.  
Indeed, popular images of the all-powerful drug lord reigning over pyramidal cartels 
attests to the notion that the narco-economies are prone to monopolistic competition and some 
degree of centralization. Again, these features are structural necessities for global illicit 
enterprises that requires multiple steps of production, refinement, transport, and distribution. The 
trans-regional dimensions of this process further reinforces the need for central organizational 
structures capable of achieving coordinated action. As a case in point, the discovery of an 
abandoned Boeing 727 in the Gao region of Northern Mali that had been estimated to be carrying 
7 to 11 tons of cocaine highlighted the degree to which the global narcotics industry has 
47 
developed.64 Registered in Guinea-Bissau and originating from Venezuela, “Air Cocaine”, as the 
plane has been dubbed, reflected the immense coordination and trans-regional ties that have 
come to sustain the illicit narco-economy; a level of coordinated action that is only possible with 
cohesive organizations with integrated orders of authority and control.65  
Thus, though the similar resource profiles of Colombia and Afghanistan seemed to 
produce varying outcomes in terms of organizational structure, the key outcomes regarding 
cohesion and integration were similar. This is due to the structural necessities of running a trans-
regional illicit drug industry, which requires a degree of centrality that permeates both the 
hierarchical and networked organizations that partake it in. The extent to which these structures 
of the economic environment imbue themselves onto political organizations is not necessarily 
simple or straightforward, as it will certainly vary with their degrees of involvement that these 
organizations have in these industries, as well as a host of other relevant intervening factors 
(ideological coherence, cultural attitudes, path dependence, etc.). However, considering the ways 
that the economic landscape structures the opportunities that actors have to pursue divergent 
action independent of an overarching organization can shed light on how some economic 
environments, indeed some war economies, prove to be more fertile grounds for defection and 
fragmentation than others. 
This preceding discussion of the structural organizational pressures that emerge from 
narco-economies has served as a point of comparison to what will follow, which is a similar 
conceptual analysis of the type of structural pressures that would emerge from a war economy 
dominated by migrant smuggling. By proposing ways in which the migrant smuggling economy  
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can create the conditions for divergent actors to defect from prevailing organizational structures 
and pursue independent interests, the driving hypothesis of this paper; namely that this economy 
has promoted fragmentation in the Northern Mali conflict, can be placed within this theoretical 
framework. This chapter will now move to a more in depth discussion of the war economy in 
Mali, and propose the ways in which developments in the smuggling trade and the means 
through which militant groups fund their operations are responsible for contributing to the high 
degree of fragmentation that the conflict has witnessed. 
 
Mali’s War Economy: Breeding ground for fragmentation? 
The war economy in Northern Mali is embedded within the extensive trans-Saharan 
smuggling networks that have sustained the region for centuries. As a ‘non resource based war 
economy’ that is largely reliant on these regionally and trans-regionally integrated smuggling 
activities, the economic environment of northern Mali evolves with the larger trends in regional 
trade and the movements of smuggled goods. Thus the region represents the type of dynamic and 
globalized war economy that Duffield describes as resulting in “a strong and contrary tendency 
toward regional schism and destabilizing political assertiveness.”66 This slippery hold on 
political power and the  tendency towards a state of ‘durable disorder’ across the global south in 
general can in part be attributed to this constantly shifting economic and material landscape that 
continually opens new opportunities for effectively challenging existing power structures and 
channeling grievances through armed force. Changes in the economic landscape can also 
exacerbate existing tensions or add an element of protractedness into ongoing conflicts by 
injecting new sources of revenues into an area that then become contested and ultimately 
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funneled into the war fighting capacities of the various parties. As Peter Lock noted in his 
analysis of the link between war economies and globalization,  
 
As long as the current regulation of the globalisation process produces a dynamic 
symbiosis of globalisation and shadow globalisation, it might be necessary to rethink our 
conceptualisation of war to arrive at a more inclusive definition, which covers the 
ongoing transformation towards more diffuse and enduring forms of organised 
violence.67  
 
Ironically, it is the vibrant global ‘shadow economy’ that has contributed to the “failure 
to build durable political hierarchies in Africa.”68 To illustrate how this global economic 
dynamism articulates at the regional level, it is useful to conceptualize three types of events that 
generally produce a shift in the economic landscape of a particular area; 1.) A new resource or 
mode of economic activity is discovered or arises locally, such as the discovery of a new lode of 
precious minerals; 2.) the demand for an existing resource or service changes as a result of a 
change in the global market, like the sudden demand for uranium at the advent of the nuclear 
age; or 3.) a resource enters from outside the region and embeds itself in within the local 
economy, perhaps through the diversion of a smuggling route through a territory.  Whether this 
injection of resources will have a cohering or fragmenting effect on militant groups depends 
largely upon the type of economic structures that they promote, and will subsequently play a 
large role in determining the nature of the conflicts that these groups are engaged in. 
As the emergence of the migrant smuggling industry in Mali represents an instance of 
this third event--that is, a new resource (migrant flows) have entered the area from outside via 
the regional transborder trade networks, this thesis is arguing that this transformation in the war 
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economy favored a more protracted and factionalized state of conflict. I have arrived at this 
hypothesis through analyzing what type of economic structures that arise around migrant 
smuggling, the manner in which it is distributed across the territory, and how this compares with 
the economic environments of earlier outbreaks of violence in Mali. For matters of organization, 
it may be useful to begin with the latter (the material environment of the 1990s Tuareg 
rebellion), then contrast this against the contemporary war economy and the role of migrant 
smuggling in shaping it.  
One of the most sophisticated attempts at a political economic analysis of conflict in Mali 
comes from Marcartan Humphreys’ and Habaye Ag Mohamed’s case study of the Tuareg 
Rebellion of 1990-1995.69 In their attempt to tease out the impact of Northern Mali’s material 
environment on the dynamics of the conflict, they concluded that the resource poor conditions of 
the area did not lend itself to protracted conflict as the rebels soon ran out of resources and 
ultimately opted for a negotiated settlement. “The financing of the Tuareg groups depended 
largely on lifting stocks of resources such as cattle and vehicles,” however “dwindling stocks left 
groups, including the leadership of the organizations, living increasingly from hand to mouth. In 
this context, a negotiated solution with the offer of a salary a part of a package [from the state] 
was increasingly attractive.”70  
A second salient finding was that the nature of the resources that acted as financing, 
primarily cattle and vehicles in this case, were diffuse and did not require an overarching and 
centralized organization to manage. They found that this diffused resource landscape was 
reflected in the lack of rebel cohesiveness, and thus delayed the signing of a negotiated peace 
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between a coherent and legitimate rebel leadership with control over their fighters, and the 
government. Such coherent leadership structure was lacking amongst the various Tuareg factions 
throughout the early to mid-stages of the rebellion as “there were weak financial consequences 
for the groups from their lack of cohesion.”71 This condition persisted along with the conflict 
until the unreplenishable resources in which the rebels relied became exhausted and the appeal of 
a negotiated settlement rose.  
These two factors, diffusion and replenishability of resources are key variables that 
permeate throughout the literature on the impact of resources on conflict dynamics (see Le 
Billon, Ross). In line with LeBillon’s typologies of conflict, diffused resources tend to give way 
to decentralized rebel zones; and the nature of the lootable resources at that sustained the rebels 
led to a lack of political cohesion, as they did not require an overarching organizational structure 
to exploit.72 However, despite this lack of political cohesion on the part of the rebels, the 
inconsistency of this revenue stream prevented Northern Mali from devolving into a protracted 
conflict area, and ultimately led to a negotiated settlement with the state. Indeed, while it was the 
nature of the economic environment that led to a degree of discoherence on the part of the 
opposition, it was the non-replenishibility of the resource landscape that ultimately caused the 
rebels to meet the government at the negotiating table in order to hash out a deal to ensure the 
continued economic viability of the region in exchange for peace. The types of resources that 
Tuareg rebels relied on throughout this conflict, cattle and vehicles, were unable to sustain the 
rebellion for long, as they represent renewable resources that are quickly exhausted and take a 
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long time to renew--an observation that is in line with the general quantitative findings regarding 
renewable resources and conflict duration.73  
By comparing this previous resource environment with the contemporary conflict in 
Mali, we can now analyze migrant smuggling in light of these salient factors and determine the 
type of conflict dynamics that we would expect to emerge from an economic environment in 
which it predominates, and discern the degree that such a conflict environment would be 
conducive to fragmentation.  The emerging research into the migrant smuggling economy across 
the Saharan region characterizes a diffused set of networks that resists overarching centralized 
structures and hierarchies.74 Indeed, this resistance towards centralization appears to be a 
structural feature of migrant smuggling activity, as the array of actors who engage in it can easily 
extract revenues with only loose ties with other nodes in the network. Smugglers simply deliver 
migrants from location to location, and need not involve themselves in ensuring their continued 
movement through the network, a responsibility that often falls on the migrants themselves. 
Horizontal ties certainly do develop amongst smugglers to comprise a loose regional network, 
however such ties are not as much of a structural necessity as they are in say, drug smuggling. 
Smugglers often scale up their operations to coordinate the entirety of a migrant’s journey, 
however any actor keen on involving themselves in smuggling need not be bound by these pre-
existing networks and can carry out profitable business independent of other nodes in the system.  
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As has been outlined, previous work indicates that we should expect a diffused political 
environment to arise from such an economic landscape. This thesis will contend that this is 
precisely what is being observed in the current conflict in Mali, as the initial rebels have 
subsequently splintered and newly minted armed groups have emerged and proliferated. While 
previous conflict in Mali have been characterized by a degree of rebel factionalism and lack of 
cohesion, the current situation has evolved into another scale entirely, with a dizzying array of 
actors and groups, from Tuareg nationalists to extremist groups, that have turned Northern Mali 
into a protracted conflict zone that has caught the concern of regional and global actors--as 
evidenced by France’s intervention from 2012-2014.75 In addition to the scale of smuggling 
activity, the continuous demand for the service, beginning with the increase in migrant flows in 
2011, has created a steady and replenishable source of revenues for an array of actors across 
Northern Mali and the wider region.  
Tracing the process that has led to this contemporary state of affairs will be the intention 
of this research. By establishing the ways in which the smuggling economy has produced a more 
decentralized and diffused economic landscape wherein centralized control is not a structural 
feature, I will highlight how disgruntled rebels have thus been able to split from central 
organizations and channel their grievances through a proliferated set of opportunity structures.  
 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the fragmentation of insurgent groups is a product of both structural features and 
agent-based motivation to defect. In terms of the latter, the level of grievance and divergent 
interests within an organization will vary according to levels of ideological and ethnic cohesion, 
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as well as the ability of leaders to inspire loyalty amongst their followers. Like the study of 
conflict in general, these specific grievances and motivations are crucial to telling the entire story 
of an insurgent movement; however, focusing on the structural characteristics that allow such 
grievances to be channeled along a viable path towards defection is the other part of the story. 
These structural features also allow for generalizable insights as to the pressures that all militant 
groups operate under, and can lead to a fuller picture of why fragmented conflicts occur and 
persist. These structural features that this thesis is focusing are of course those that emanate from 
Mali’s war economy, and specifically how the migrant smuggling economy has opened avenues 
for defection and the ensuing state of fragmentation throughout the conflict zone. As Gutierrez et 
al noted, “for armies, the condition of survival is internal cohesion, and so allowing direct access 
of individual fighters or of the middle rank to rents [...] is suicidal.”76 The argument here is that 
precluding or controlling access to the rents that may be derived from the migrant smuggling 
economy is highly difficult, if not impossible. 
Thus, by providing the means through which disgruntled rebels may accumulate the 
necessary resources to defect independent of any overarching hierarchy or integrated network, 
the migrant smuggling economy has played a crucial role in creating the fragmented nature the 
opposition, and the conflict dynamics more generally. In order to detect the extent to which this 
is the case, and avoid any charges of reductionism, it is necessary to focus in on the broader 
drivers of conflict in Mali over the years, and track the role that evolutions in the smuggling 
economy have played in transforming the conflict landscape; and it is to this task that the 
following chapter now turns.        
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Chapter 4 
 
The Case of Conflict in Mali 
The conflict-ridden history of Mali serves as a natural case study for analyzing the ways 
transformations in a region’s resource environment produce different conflict dynamics. This 
analysis will run a qualitative comparison between the current conflict in Mali and the Tuareg 
rebellion in the 1990s. As both of these conflicts have been initiated by a common set of actors 
expressing a common list of grievances, these political factors can be held more or less constant 
and economic drivers can stand in a more prominent explanatory position. Thus, this analysis can 
shed light on how the changes in the regional smuggling economy have contributed to the 
increase in factionalism amongst the armed groups in the north of Mali. It will begin with the 
conflict of the 1990s and identify the main actors that emerged throughout the course of the 
conflict, and highlight how the organizational structure of this rebellion was largely derived from 
the surrounding resource environment. It will then discuss the transformation in the regional 
smuggling economy that began with the arrival of drugs flows in the mid-2000s, and the way this 
form of smuggling broke apart many of the social bonds that held traditionally maintained the 
socio-economic equilibrium of the north. The explosive characteristics of these breaks came in 
the form of the current conflict which began in 2012. This analysis will demonstrate that while 
both conflict periods were characterized by the type of decentralized resource landscape 
described in the previous chapter, the factionalism that has emerged recently is much more 
calcified. Indeed, the current conflict has witnessed former allies take opposing sides of the 
conflict and violently contesting competing claims for the future of northern Mali. It will in turn 
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analyze this development from a political economic perspective, and argue that this 
unprecedented factionalism is largely emergent from Mali’s smuggling economy.  
These intertwined social, political, and economic developments tell the story of northern 
Mali’s recent history, and represent the context in which migrant flows would enter begin in 
2011. This chapter will conclude by placing the migrant smuggling economy within this story, 
and argue the ways in which it has re-enforced these latent and growing social cleavages, and 
thus contributed to the increase in factionalism in the conflict in Mali.  
 
1990s: ‘The Second Tuareg Rebellion’ 
The events of 2012 in northern Mali seemed to be a reiteration of a cycle of civil conflict 
that many hoped had been finally arrested nearly two decades ago. The conflict of the 1990s, 
what is dubbed the “second Tuareg rebellion” after the initial uprising in the 1960s that was 
brutally squashed by the Malian state-- lasted nearly six years until the signing of a series of 
peace accords and the ceremonial burning over nearly 3000 weapons in Timbuktu in 1996.77 It 
began in 1990 with a series of planned and premeditated attacks on government installations in 
the north by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA).78 Like 2012, this 
movement was predominantly Tuareg, though was formed under the aegis of representing the 
interests of the entire north. Many MPLA fighters previously gained extensive combat 
experience throughout the 1970s and 80s in Palestine, Lebanon, and Afghanistan after being 
recruited into Muammar Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion. Thus, unlike the 1960s, the government’s 
aggressive attempts to repress the uprising were repelled by the new liberation movement, killing 
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nearly 200 government troops in one battle in September of 1990.79  This new combat reality led 
the government towards a different approach.  
Utilizing their capital with a number of Tuareg tribal elites, the government encouraged 
the less radical elders to speak out against the strain of separatism that permeated some elements 
of the movement, and ultimately sat down with a number of rebel leaders in Tamanrasset, 
Algeria in January 1991 to hash a conciliatory road forward.80 The Tamanrasset Accords were 
considered quite generous on the part of the government, as they agreed to an eventual 
demilitarization in the north and the initiation of decentralization process that would empower 
northern communities with a significant degree of autonomy. The accords also included a set of 
material rewards for the rebels in the form of integration into the Malian armed forces and a 
number of public positions, from local administrative jobs to ministerial roles in the capital. 
Following the accords, the MPLA officially changed its name to the Popular Movement of 
Azawad (MPA), notably dropping the term of “liberation” and re-affirming their commitment to 
maintain the territorial integrity of Mali.81  
The negotiations proved controversial on both sides, with the government largely keeping 
the details secret for fear that it would be perceived as a “surrender by the South 
[government].”82 On the rebel side, the negotiations brought an array of ethnic and ideological 
divisions to a head. The Arab components of the movement broke away to form the Islamique et 
Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA) in order to secure their own interests in what increasingly seen as a 
Tuareg dominated movement, though they largely retained cooperative relations with the (MPA) 
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and were committed to the implementation of the accords. Deeper strains began to emerge 
however with rises level of violence that were taking on an increasingly ethnic dynamic.  
In the process of the political transition in Bamako and the reforms of the armed services 
that were a crucial component of the accords led to frustration within the Malian army, a 
frustration which was routinely unleashed upon targets in the north, particularly around the 
regional hub of Gao. Feeling increasingly targeted, and abandoned by the south as the promised 
benefits of the Tamanrasset accords were slow to materialize, Tuareg and Arab fighters 
increasingly turned to banditry. The sedentary communities that were victimized by these attacks 
formed their own self-defense militias that were not hesitant to conduct collective retaliation 
against the nomadic “whites” (Arabs and Tuaregs) that were threatening their livelihood. 
Macartan Humphreys and Habaye Ag Mohamed note: 
 
By mid 1991 public displays of violence, such as the public burning of a nomad, or the 
destruction of premises owned by Arab traders, led to enormous refugee flows from the 
white settled as well as nomadic populations. By the end of the summer, Timbuktu was 
all but deserted by white groups.83 
 
Despite peace accords being negotiated and agreed upon in the early part of 1991 by the 
leaders of the largest rebel groups and the government, such racialized violence and banditry 
persisted for many years. In 1994, these conditions spurred the creation of the Ganda Koy 
(“masters of the land” in the Songhai language) by a Songhoi deserter of the Malian army who 
had lost faith in that institution's ability to protect the north’s sedentary population. Rather than a 
ragtag militia group, the Ganda Koy proved to be quite a stout military force, in so small part to 
the deserters from the national army that filled their ranks. After a summary execution of nine 
accused cattle rustlers, the Ganda Koy was able to repel a counter-attack by the MFUA (a 
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coalition of the main Tuareg and Arab militant groups).84 Humphreys and Mohamed observe that 
“the formation of the Ganda Koy marked the transition of the war from a struggle directed 
against the central government to an intercommunal conflict.”85 The banditry, insecurity, and 
fragmentation of the north along ethnic and racial lines became an endemic feature of this 
conflict as it developed, as neither the MPA, FIAA, nor the government was able to control the 
behavior of their troops.  
Though this lack of cohesion would seem pathological, and indeed it often led to horrific 
humanitarian consequences, it is hard to attribute this intercommunal violence solely to ancient 
hatreds or the proclivity towards racism or violence by any one group. Rather, there is ample 
reason to believe that, instead of being a simple reflection of a lack of discipline or 
professionalization amongst these groups, it was in large part a product of decentralized 
organizational structures. For one, this fragmentation and lack of cohesion affected nearly all 
ethnic groups party to the conflict, suggesting a more general environmental factor which places 
diffusionary pressures on these groups. In addition to Tuareg disagreements over the 
Tamansararat accords, the Arabs saw significant fragmentation with the creation of their own 
FIAA in 1991, which subsequently broke into the Front Populaire pour la Libération de 
l’Azawad (FPLA) and the Armée Révolutionnaire pour le Libération de l’Azawad (ARLA).86 
These fragmentary pressures affected the whole span of professionalism as well, with the 
relatively experienced and trained MPLA splitting at the first moments of contentious political 
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decision making (the Tamarassant negotiations), not to mention the fact that the Ganda Koy was 
largely the product of a schism within the Malian army.87  
This general diffusionary pressure leads one to ask: was there something in the 
environment at the time that could account for this? As argued in chapter four, the answer is 
likely to lie in the resource environment of the conflict. Rebels largely relied on the rustling of 
cattle and theft of vehicles to attain the resources necessary for war-making. As noted previously, 
Macartan and Mohamed link this resource base with the organizational structure of the rebels.88 
This was a war economy characterized by diffuse resources, which LeBillon noted is generally 
associated with decentralized militant movements. Further, the nature of this resource profile 
(stolen cattle and vehicles) particularly lends itself to what appear to be targeted violence, as the 
means of acquiring them necessarily entails a violent dispossession. As one Malian military 
official observed soon after the war, “it proved difficult to differentiate between insurgency and 
sheer banditry.”89 This banditry was not merely the product of over-eager troops breaking with 
discipline to snatch an easy opportunity for personal enrichment (though this undoubtedly 
occurred), but rather it represented a fundamental element of the rebel war effort. However, 
despite this decentralization and problems of maintaining a cohesive unity amongst the rank and 
file, some semblance of cohesion remained at the group level as quarrels over strategy and 
leadership, or the fundamental political aims of the rebellion, remained limited in comparison to 
2012. Utilizing Scheele’s conception of the nature of low value commodity trading and tribal 
solidarities, this relative coherence at the highest levels largely derived from the fact the value of 
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the resources and theft that sustained the war effort was of relatively low, and thus did not 
challenge the existing social arrangements that sustained the position of the Tuareg leadership. 
In addition, the non-replenishability of these resources prevented the solidification of any 
schismatic movements before they could develop an independent and sustainable resource base. 
By 1995 the violence abated and the warring parties agreed to disband at the ceremonial burning 
of the weapons in Timbuktu. A year earlier, such an outcome “would have seemed impossible,” 
given the fresh grievances that were accumulating almost daily and the powerful military 
momentum of the Ganda Koy.90 Indeed, many of the key elements of a protracted conflict seems 
present, except of course a resource base that could sustain it. “Dwindling stocks left groups, 
including the leadership of the organizations, living increasingly from hand to mouth. In this 
context, a negotiated solution with the offer of a salary a part of a package [from the state] was 
increasingly attractive.”91 
What began as a largely unified armed movement with real political demands against 
state, quickly disintegrated into a factionalized conflict that witnessed high levels of inter-
communal strife and targeted ethnic violence. These developments were facilitated by a war 
economy with a diffused resource profile that facilitated decentralized rebel organizational 
structures. However, it was the nature of these resources that, unlike the conflict in 2012, some 
level of elite cohesion was maintained; while their ultimate non-replenishability eventually 
closed off any path forward for rebels. The North’s resource poor environment encouraged 
regional elites to look towards the state to provide the means necessary to maintain the economic 
viability of the region, and the socio-economic system that laid over it. It was in this context that 
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peace negotiations took place, and the subsequent agreements seemed to produce commitments 
that were satisfactory to all relevant parties; at least for a time.  
 
Breaking of the Bonds: The run-up to 2012 and the breakdown of the post 1990s order 
The system of co-option that kept the north pacified, especially the restive Tuareg 
population, began to breakdown in the mid to late 2000s as a result of significant changes in the 
region’s socio-economic life. These changes not only threatened the north-south linkages that 
Bamako relied on to govern its periphery from a distance, but also pressured the entrenched local 
hierarchies that had organized the north for decades. Since the National Pact of 1992, the initial 
peace framework that was eventually accepted by all parties in 1996 (the event that the 
ceremonial burning of weapons was meant to celebrate), the Malian state has embarked on a 
project of decentralization that was a key demand of northern rebels. Remarking on this new 
political arrangement, and what it presaged for the future, Boas notes that “this may be read as an 
attempt to empower local populations, but also became a tool for local aspiring big men to 
organize their communes as they saw fit.”92 This restructuring of the political relations between 
north and south that seemed to be so essential to ending the conflict in the 1990s would quickly 
begin laying the groundwork for the next one in a way that would highlight the persistent 
dialectic of conflict and change in a region where politics and dynamic shadow economies open 
new avenues to contestation as quickly as old ones are closed off.  
 Since the times of French colonialism, outside actors with an interest in exerting control 
in northern Mali would use the region’s diverse ethnic composition and complex social 
structures as a way to exercise influence in the vast territory. These fault lines to be exploited 
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could be found both within and between competing groups, with the tried and true methods of 
divide and rule and selective co-option of local big men presenting the strategy of choice of first 
the French colonizers, and more recently the modern Malian state.93 Thus, the National Pact of 
1992 was one in a long line of renegotiations between elites in the north and south as they 
adapted to the changing circumstances of modernity. However, by the mid-2000s, the state’s 
withdrawal from the north and the effective demilitarization of the region further structured the 
north of Mali as a place where regional shadow economies can thrive; and it was changes in this 
illicit economy, and the global links and technological advancements that animate it, that would 
lead to a breakdown in the post 1990s order and lay the groundwork for events of 2012 and 
beyond.  
 Traditionally complementing their livelihoods with the smuggling of cigarettes and other 
legal goods, the people of the northern Mali, and the Sahara-Sahel zone more generally, have 
comprised an essential node in the informal socioeconomic links across the desert.94 This 
comprised a steady income for money, but it was never a path to quick riches or exorbitant 
wealth. For this, the state became a key source of resources and a short cut to wealth and 
prestige. This spicket was turned by the cyclical conflict machine that would allow certain 
‘ethnic-military’ to capture ‘post rebellion payoffs’ in the form of the usurpation of newly 
earmarked development aid or cushy public jobs at the local or national level.95 As unstable and 
undesirous as such a system may appear, it bears repeating that Mali was held up as a model of 
democratization and conflict control/resolution throughout the 1990s despite the low intensity 
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conflict that burned throughout the decade. Indeed, as far as countries characterized by repetitive 
conflict cycles go, Mali could have been doing much worse.  
 By the mid-2000s however a new source of quick and exorbitant wealth would emerge 
that would encourage the contestation of the system by those who felt marginalized by it. Due to 
increased interdiction efforts in North America, Latin American drug cartels began looking 
towards Europe and Africa as alternative markets for their product. Authorities in West Africa 
seized 46 tons of cocaine between 2005 and 2008, with estimates from the UNODC figuring that 
this represented only a fraction of the total cocaine being transiting through the region, which 
was estimated to value nearly 1.8 billion USD. “The share remaining in the hands of local 
African cartels is estimated at around 450 million US$ per year, or 0.5 percent of overall West 
African GDP.”96  
 Guinea Conakry is reportedly the main entry point for this regional illicit network after 
increased US-supported crackdowns on drug cartels in neighboring Guinea Bissau.  Here, “the 
business was moved to new and safer grounds, less in the spotlight,” and would continue its 
clandestine journey through West Africa, through the Sahara desert, and on to the lucrative 
northern markets. In Mali, reports indicate the witnessing of “Peruvian scouts” in the north as 
early as the early 2000s as they attempted to locate suitable navigation routes through the 
country.97 These routes would follow the paths of pre-existing networks that were structured 
around ethnic and kinship ties that have long facilitated the “connectivity” of the desert space 
that is essential to the movement of goods and people across it. For example, it has been reported 
that most of the cocaine entering Mali moves through the Guinean port city of Labe, which has 
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been described as the capital of the Fulani-Peul people who are spread across Guinea and Mali. 
In contrast to their traditional reputation as nomadic herders, the Fulani are known to control 
nearly 90% of the import/export trade between Guinea and Mali and are thus believed to have 
played a crucial role in the movement of narco-shipments through Bamako on to the regional of 
hub of Gao in the north.98  
 North of Gao, the traditional droits de passage (rights of passage) traditionally came 
under the aegis of Arab and Tuareg tribes.99 It is at this point that the true Sahara begins, and 
where intensive and socially embedded knowledge of the terrain has been essential to survival, 
let alone successful maintenance of consistent trans-desert trading ties. However, the arrival of 
cocaine smuggling represented something different from goods that had animated the smuggling 
industry in the past. The structural necessities of such narco-trafficking were different from those 
of lower value goods, a fact which would stress the socio-economic equilibrium and traditional 
hierarchies of the region. As anthropologist Judith Steele observes, 
 
Small [smuggling] networks do not explicitly rely on tribal links, but they nevertheless 
reproduce the major divisions to the extent that these determine everyday social ties, 
shared material interests and marriage alliances.... In contrast, drug trafficking is 
described as a means for an individual to get rich fast, to the detriment of wider 
solidarities.100 
 
The immense riches that could befell actors even in entry level roles were indeed 
dramatic. For instance, drivers who previously made a living transporting smuggled fuel or other 
subsidized goods from Algeria to Mali often made the switch to driving cocaine shipments. 
Rainari and Strazzari’s research reveals the inner workings of the operation: 
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Drivers and passeurs are recruited locally and are paid—in advance—quite lavishly to 
transport the cargo, whose content they sometimes are unaware of, to a given location 
identified by GPS coordinates. Here the goods are either buried under the sand or directly 
handed over to the person in charge of the subsequent transport segment. Throughout the 
journey, drivers are to keep constant radio or satellite contact as a form of mutual 
insurance: armed “area controllers” ensure the security of the convoy while preventing it 
and its precious load from disappearing from surveillance. Each delivery is reportedly 
paid an amount estimated at between 3,000 US$6000. All sources agree that, after a 
certain number of successful journeys (three to five, depending on the source), drivers are 
allowed to keep the vehicle.101 
 
These quick riches undermined the usual socio-economic relationships that facilitated the 
delegation of employment and resources, while the arrival of GPS navigation and 
communication technology allowed smugglers to circumvent the traditional (taxed) routes and 
rely less on the services of the masters of the land.102 This undermined the traditional relations 
both within and between groups, with previously marginalized groups, castes, or even 
individuals were able to acquire an independent livelihood and source of income free from 
controlling power structures. This is illustrated by analyzing the predominant ethnic, and sub-
ethnic tribal, groups that were active early on in the narco-smuggling industry. Indeed it was not 
the existing elite or dominate tribes that absorbed this new industry, but vassal classes who were 
able to seize the opportunity to transform these riches into political power, and thus challenge the 
traditional order of things.  
A significant portion of these narco shipments would pass through Gao towards Algeria 
via the Tilemsi valley, and area controlled by the Tilemsi Arabs, or else be directed through the 
other logistical hub of Timbuktu where Arabs of the Berbiche community would facilitate their 
transit north.103 While this would largely follow traditional routes long used to transport legal 
 
101 Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad.” 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
67 
goods such as subsidized fuel and foodstuff, as well as cigarettes and migrants, the operations of 
these drug shipments took on a much different dynamic. The enormous profits to be gained from 
this high value, low volume (and thus easily transportable) commodity made the risk of theft 
much more acute. This often led to upstream cartels in Latin America to demand upfront cash 
payments as a form of insurance before handing over their precious cargo to Sahelian tribes for 
transport.104 These structural pressures served to increase the rate of inner communal violence as 
the value of control over smuggling routes suddenly skyrocketed, and the heightened cost of 
entry to the lucrative business (via upstream insurance payments) created incentives to acquire 
these startup funds through any means necessary. Indeed, the rise in kidnappings that plagued the 
region beginning in in 2003 by remnants of the Algerian GSPC that had fled to Mali and would 
begin to form the precursors to AQIM would provide a crucial source of rents that could open 
the doors to the lucrative narcotics trade.   
 
katibas of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would typically hand over ransom 
money they had received to drug traffickers as a form of investment. Depending on the 
situation and the source, up to half the profits generated from drug trafficking would be 
paid back in kind to the jihadis, via weapons, ammunition, four-wheel-drive vehicles, and 
other equipment. Traffickers would typically buy arms on behalf of terrorist groups, who 
could thereby avoid exposing themselves.105 
 
In this case the lines between terrorism and crime, the jihadist and the smuggler, become 
increasingly blurred as many of AQMI’s leaders integrating themselves in the communities 
central to the trafficking of drugs. One of the earliest illustrative examples may arguably be 
found in the person of Mokhtar BelMokhtar, a GSPC leader throughout the 1990s in Algeria and 
was known under the moniker “Mr. Marlboro” for his involvement in regional cigarette 
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smuggling. “Mr. Marlboro” would soon take on the title of ‘bin laden of the Sahara’ as he was 
instrumental in aligning elements of the Algerian GSPC with Al Qaeda in the late 1990s and 
2000s, and had positioned himself to cash in on the flows of Andean cocaine after settling in the 
town of Lerneb and marrying the daughter of a prominent Berbiche Arab.106 From here 
Belmokhtar was able to move up the smuggling value chain, and move that many suspect was 
facilitated by his ties to kidnappings, as he negotiated the release of 32 western hostages in 2003 
in return for a 5 million Euro ransom.107  
The early involvement of the Berbiche and Tilemsi Arabs in the drug smuggling trade not 
only served as an opening for foreign fighters with Islamist ties to infiltrate the social fabric of 
northern Mali, but it increasingly stressed the local socio-economic balance. As traditional vassal 
tribes, the economic empowerment of the Berbiche and Tilemsi posed a political threat to the 
ruling power structures, particularly the Kounta tribe that claim descent from the prophet and 
have held a dominant, tribute extracting position in northern Mali since the start of the 20th 
century.108 This tribal dividing line was also paralleled in the Tuareg community, where the 
involvement in narco smuggling of traditional vassal class, the Imghad, was tolerated by Bamako 
in order to offset the power of the Imghad nobles. “Unsurprisingly,” Strazzesi notes, “Kunta and 
Ifoghas have often joined forces in defense of the status quo among northern Mali’s “white” 
communities.”109 Seeking to claim their share of the lucrative business, and re-assert their claim 
over the droits de passage (rights of passage), the Ifoghas began an increasingly assertive 
campaign to collect taxes on the narco when and where they could. The situation grew 
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increasingly explosive as violence became a prominent tool in this high stakes game of profit and 
control. As Shaw and Tinti note, “prior to the country’s collapse, much of northern Mali, 
specifically Kidal, was controlled by an increasingly complex patchwork of militias who sought 
to collect rents and levy taxes on goods passing through their territory.”110 
In sum, the injection of a new resource (narcotics) into the region represented an almost 
immediate diversification of the economic landscape. This diversification creates an increased 
array of opportunity structures for marginalized actors to gather an independent resource base 
and challenge the prevailing power structures that were rooted in the pre-existing socio-
economic order. The empowerment of the Berbiche and Tiilemsi Arabs, as well as the Imghad 
Tuareg via their involvement in the cocaine smuggling demonstrates that even the most 
entrenched social structures can be shaken in response to significant changes in the surrounding 
resource environment. Indeed, Bencherif observes that while  
in certain societies, such as in that of the Tuareg, a degree of rigidity still structures social 
categories, particularly between the noblemen, vassals and freed slaves. This rigidity, 
which characterizes other ethnic groups as well, can however be mitigated under certain 
circumstances: when political and social tensions occur [or] when competition over 
political or economic resources increase…111 
 
As a region where smuggling activity reigns supreme, the displacement of consistent 
streams of relatively low value goods by high valued narcotics render traditional social ties to 
places of secondary concern, as the road to quick riches, and the insulating effects this could 
have on one’s material security, empowered actors to chart their own paths. Whereas the 
previous socio-economic environment was characterized by a high degree of decentralization 
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and networked power relations rather than centralized hierarchies, it was nonetheless an 
integrated system held together by deep social bonds that were reproduced through relations of 
exchange, division of smuggling routes, and cooperative negotiation amongst regional elites. By 
the mid-2000s however, the traditional tribal hierarchies that comprised the central nodes of 
these regional networks began to lose their centrality. In this sense the political environment 
came to more closely align with the type of diffused networks described in chapter three, with 
marginalized actors able to disentangle themselves from the power of hierarchies and enter new 
networks that did not demand of them the same type of political allegiances.  
This change in the political economic environment in turn sheds light on the interaction 
of resources and a priori social structures. Rather than a simple quantitative increase in resources 
leading to political fragmentation, the type of resource that narcotics represent (in the form of 
smuggled goods), significantly structures the way in which such fragmentation takes place. The 
high cost of entry and transregional ties that were necessary to link into the narco-smuggling 
business necessitated the complicity of state authorities that would provide some level of 
guarantee for the products unencumbered passage from the West African coast up into the 
Sahara. The existence of an extensive Malian shadow state involved in the trafficking of drugs 
has been well documented, particularly in the aftermath of the “Air Cocaine” incident which 
reportedly carried around 10 tons of cocaine, or “roughly equivalent to one per cent of the entire 
yearly global production of cocaine, or over one-third of Britain’s entire yearly consumption.”112 
Reports indicate that Malian authorities deliberately bungled the investigation, resulting in the 
release of all suspects and no charges ever being brought and “raised suspicions of collusion with 
traffickers at the highest levels of the state.”113 This state complicity in turn favored the more 
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marginalized actors in the north as Bamako allowed, or facilitated, their involvement in the 
industry in the hopes of balancing against the traditional nobility who played a key role in 
previous rebellions. 
From the north on down, opportunistic jihadists funneled in from surrounding countries, 
and even outside of the region, to seize the opportunity provided by the industry. As … notes, “it 
is the way in which a high-value, hyper-modern and globalized form of business activity was put 
in the service of traditional forms of political and social organization that helps account for its 
destructive legacy.”114 Thus, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the roots of Mali’s 
regional and dynamics global war economy were taking hold. The schisms that formed during 
this period became crucial fault lines over which the impending conflict would play out, while 
the transformed political economic landscape would structure the rebel’s demands against the 
state constrain their capacity to act collectively and maintain unity behind a common political 
vision.  
The following chapter will outline the events of 2012 and beyond and discuss how this 
altered resource environment produced qualitative differences in this conflict in comparison with 
the 1990s. This will produce answers to several questions pertaining to the apparent paradox of a 
‘nomadic state’ that stood as a central demand of the initial Tuareg insurgency, and the role that 
borders would play creating the smuggling markets that have structured the interests and 
capacities of specific actors throughout the conflict and thus produced the organizational 
structure of the northern opposition. This analysis will finally allow for the migrant smuggling 
economy to be placed within its appropriate context, and ultimately isolate the specific ways in 
which it has altered the conflict dynamics in Mali.  
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Chapter 5 
 
2012 and the Emergence of Migrant Smuggling 
The events of 2012 seemed to many another reverberation of Mali’s long structural 
conflict between the north and south. However, as the so called “third Tuareg rebellion” 
unfolded, it appeared that the country was dealing with something quite different than ever 
before. First, the rapid advance of the northern rebels, under the banner of the Tuareg led 
MNLA, shocked even the Malian state, which would soon experience a coup d’état largely in 
response to frustrations over the inept handling of the rapidly deteriorating crisis in the north on 
the part of the military’s middle and low ranks. This increased military capacity occurred in 
conjunction with the return of the many Tuareg fighters from Libya following the fall of 
Muammar Gaddafi, who pulled a stream of sophisticated and modern weaponry in their wake. 
This quick military success also relied a second key difference, which revolved around the 
‘alliance of convenience’ made between the MNLA and the jihadi groups that had gained a 
foothold in the north throughout the previous decade. Armed with a cadre of devoted fighters and 
flushed with cash, this ‘unholy alliance’ between the Tuareg MNLA and the Al Qaeda 
breakaway groups known as MUJAO formed an unstoppable force that soon succeeded in 
expelling all semblances of state authority from the north; taking complete control over the 
region by April 2012.115 
As in 1990, this initial unity would soon dissolve into a collection of competing visions 
that largely followed the faultlines of tribe and ethnicity. In addition, these divisions also 
reflected the respective ‘modes of production’ of these groups as they followed a course that was 
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most amenable to the structural needs of their means of extraction. These competing visions have 
been broken down into three main strands, which themselves represent another break with past 
conflicts. The first is that of a sovereign and independent state of Azawad in the north, which 
MNLA leaders declared on April 6th of 2012.116 This event was indeed novel, as previous 
Tuareg uprisings primarily focused on increased autonomy and lack of state meddling in their 
nomadic livelihoods. In addition, the idea itself seemed paradoxical.  
 
The claim for independent statehood is at cross-purposes with the traditional picture of 
the Tuareg as the quintessentially uprooted community, nomadic people par excellence 
with no attachment whatsoever to the lands they roam. Indeed, one might well wonder 
about the meaning of the armed uprising that, in the early months of 2012, mobilized a 
nomadic national identity in a military offensive that led to the proclamation of the 
independent state of Azawad.117 
 
According to Rainari and Strazzari, the answer to this riddle can be found in the 
transformed political economic landscape described in the previous section. With the emergence 
of narco-trafficking, “the geopolitical value of control of desert routes has skyrocketed, 
especially in the remotest areas of Mali.”118 This not only created a market for armed protection, 
but also the enforcement of borders and traditional droits de passage that the Tuareg elite were 
keen on re-establishing. With these developments, the conditions for state-making were present, 
though competitive elements in the north would rise up and contest the claims of the MNLA.  
The second competing vision was that of a regional Islamic state in accordance with 
Sharia law that was advanced by the MNLA’s initial allies and later rivals--MUJAO and Ansar 
Din. What on the surface may appear as a simple incidence of ideological divergence, actually 
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reveals the extent to which the rebel fragmentation was being driven by material factors. Briscoe 
notes of Mali that “very few countries have experienced an armed insurgency so strongly rooted 
in criminal networks, no more so than in the case of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJAO).”119 With strong ties to the Tellemsi-Arab and Fulani communities, 
whose involvement in the narco-smuggling economy was documented in the previous section, 
MUJAO can be seen as an attempt to preserve the interests of these traders from the threat of 
Tuareg domination. Indeed, the case of the city of Gao provides a stark illustration of the 
tensions building up between the MNLA and MUJAO as their cooperative occupation of the city 
quickly broke down until the former was eventually expelled by the latter. While MNLA fighters 
largely relied on their traditional mode of accumulation and financing (ie: banditry and theft), the 
MUJAO used their narco-funds to purchase the loyalty of many influential segments of the Gao 
population whose interests they intended to serve. MUJAO’S tough imposition of ‘law and 
order’ in the form of a particularly draconian version of Sharia law can at once be seen as a 
direct attack on the MNLA rank and file whom themselves did a good portion of the looting, but 
also a way to gain the support of the local business community by laying down the structural 
scaffolding under which high value commercial trading could continue: 
 
Soon MUJAO gained the backing of Gao’s cercle des notables, the most widely 
recognized local representative body. This institution’s membership is slightly but 
significantly different from the traditional leadership inasmuch as it is entirely informal 
and open to non-aristocratic members of civil society: wealthy merchants. Three notables 
volunteered to act as mediators between MUJAO and the local population throughout the 
period of Islamist control over the city. They were Ali Badi Maiga, Mohamed Baye 
Maiga, and (once again) Mohamed Ould Mataly: two local Songhais and one Tilemsi 
Arab. The three men are all wealthy, their fortunes allegedly linked to illicit trafficking 
and criminal activities and in need of armed protection.120 
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MUJAO’s military targets also prove illustrative, as they expended much effort to attack 
Algerian border stations in order to facilitate illicit commerce, as well as “keep the frontiers 
open” and free of the cumbersome taxation of the Kidal Tuareg.  
 
Local elites connected to drug cartels, many of them Arabs, feared the prospect of border 
control enforced by the Tuareg in a new state and thus feared the State of Azawad 
altogether. As a result, they decided to wage war against it, or at least to support 
implicitly those who opposed its establishment. Against a backdrop of religious zeal, the 
ideologies of free trade and global, borderless jihadism went hand-in-hand.121 
 
 The third vision more closely resembled remnants of the 1990s, as local militias and 
schismatic Tuareg and Arab groups have aligned themselves with the Malian government against 
the project of separatism and present themselves as adherents to a more explicitly Malian 
political identity. This third pillar is largely comprised of sedentary communities with divergent 
interests and historical enmities with the nomadic Tuareg. Many of the roots of these fighters 
date back to the Ganda Koy, and later Ganda Iso, militias formed in previous conflicts to protect 
the land and interests of black sedentary populations. Formed under the common banner of the 
CFMR in July of 2012, “the main objective of this grouping, which formed as a result of the 
2012 crisis, was to reconquer territories, which had fallen into the hands first of armed rebel 
groups and then of jihadist groups.”122 Indeed, territory and land has always been a crucial 
element of life for these sedentary communities reliant on the agriculture it can produce, 
however as a result of the change that occurred in the north’s war economy this land was now 
increasingly coveted by Tuareg and Arab traders. The crucial difference now was that rather than 
simply retaining the ability to move goods across these territories, a right that could always be 
negotiated, these traders (smugglers) now wanted complete control over the land so as to 
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maximize the profits that can be extracted throughout the transport process, especially at the 
crossing of borders. Resistance to such a project made the CFMR a natural ally of Bamako, and 
indeed “their creation and, especially, their participation in the negotiations, were encouraged by 
the transitional government to counter the influence of the MNLA and HCUA [described 
below].”123 
 These three visions have formed a sort tripartite grouping of actors jockeying for position 
in the peace process. The main opposition groups have organized under the umbrella of the CMA 
in order to negotiate as a united front against the Bamako. The CMA coalition is comprised of 
the MNLA and the HCUA--a breakaway Tuareg group led by the tribal chief of the Ifoghas of 
Kidal--as well as the CMFPR II, the MAA-dissident, and the CPA. While the grouping 
represents a broad set of communities and interests, the general motivating principle is rooted in 
the desire for an independent Azawad. The MNLA, HCUA, and CPA are largely led and 
composed of Ifoghas Tuareg, with battles over leadership leading to cracks in the initially united 
front; while CMFPR II and MAA-dissident groups broke away from the mainstream 
organizations representing the interests of the Songhai/ Fulani and Arab communities, 
respectively. This coalition is contrasting with the Platform of groups aligned with Bamako and 
committed to national unity (see table below).124 
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CMA 
 
 
Platform 
MNLA GATIA 
HCUA CMFPR I 
CMFPR II MAA 
MAA Dissident  
CPA  
 
  
 The GATIA is largely organized to represent the interest of the Imghad Tuareg, whose 
involvement in the illicit trafficking economy was tolerated by the state. The CMFPR I and 
MAA represent other groups that developed extensive ties to drug smuggling networks; namely 
the Fulani and Berbiche Arabs, respectively.125 Thus what all these groups of the platform share 
is their traditionally marginalized social status, and a newly empowered capacity to challenge 
this prevailing social structure via access to narco-smuggling revenues. The security of this 
industry, and thus of their livelihood, in turn required a certain level of cooperation with the 
Malian state that goes some way to explaining their current alignment with Bamako. In this way, 
the division between the independence leaning CMA and pro-Bamako Platform can be viewed as 
being laid over the socio-economic fissures that emerged from the arrival of drug flows prior to 
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2012; with the traditional tribal elite attempting to assert their right to collect taxes and tribute 
from the trade, a process that eventually leads to conceptions of their rightful sovereignty over 
the north. In contrast, the previously marginalized groups are aligning with (and at some level 
encouraged by the state to facilitate the movement of illicit flows from the West African coast--
all the while sidelining the previously ‘troublesome’ actors of the north--namely the Ifoghas 
Tuareg whom had led most previous rebellions. These political economic forces have also been 
active at the inner-group level. Speaking of the fragmentation of the MAA, African conflict 
analyst Andrew McGregor observes: 
 
The mainstream MAA is dominated by members of the Lamhar clan, a group whose 
recent prosperity and large new homes in Gao are attributed to their prominent role in 
moving drug shipments through northern Mali. Some reports have characterized the split 
in the MAA as being directly related to a struggle for control of drug-trafficking routes 
through northern Mali.126 
 
The transformative effects of the drug smuggling economy have thus played a key role in 
determining the political dimensions of the post 2012 crisis in Mali. From structuring the 
demands of various rebel groups against the state, as well as empowering previously 
marginalized actors to pursue their own agendas independent of the prevailing power networks, 
the current conflict dynamics in Mali can be seen as emergent properties of the surrounding 
resource environment. Whereas the conflict in the 1990s was driven primarily by demands for 
increased autonomy and development funds from the state in Bamako, the current conflict has 
been characterized by demands for independence and complete sovereign control over a region 
whose political and economic value has skyrocketed as a result of changes in the smuggling 
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economy. In turn, the composition of the opposition shows a much higher degree of 
fragmentation, with four officially recognized factions in 1990 vs eight today (not counting the 
various jihadi groups whom are secluded from formal peace negotiations as well as the numerous 
self-defense militias that seem to multiply daily.) Analyzing the tribal and ethnic makeup of 
these new factions reveals that they have largely emerged from marginalized segments of 
northern society that have been engaged in the narco-smuggling economy; suggesting that the 
increased fragmentation of the northern opposition is in part a product of changes in the 
economic environment.  
This is the political economic landscape that the migrant smuggling economy would enter 
as the flows of migrants transiting Mali would increase greatly throughout the course of the 
conflict. Largely a result of exterior events, in particular the collapse of the Libyan state and the 
cessation of the coastline monitoring, the increase of migrant and refugee flows from Sub-
Saharan Africa attempting to reach Europe would become a fundamental pillar Mali’s war 
economy. Research shows that rather than overtaking and supplanting the narco-smuggling 
economy, the migrant smuggling economy would emerge and reinforce developments that were 
firmly underway, whilst redirecting or slowing other trends. The following section will move to a 
detailed analysis of the migrant smuggling economy in Mali and outline the ways in which it has 
altered the political economic landscape and conflict dynamics of the country. Just as narco-
smuggling represented a certain type of smuggling activity that carried its own structural 
necessities that in turn shaped the surrounding political environment, migrant smuggling also is a 
unique activity in its own right, and it is these specificities that account for the ways in which it 
has altered the conflict dynamics in Mali.  
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The Emergence of the Migrant Smuggling Economy 
The movement of migrants across the Sahara and Sahel zone has been a fundamental 
aspect the regional economy for centuries; a coping mechanism that has become all the more 
vital in the face of building climatic and demographic pressures. This movement was 
traditionally part and parcel of the broader trans-Saharan smuggling caravans that trafficked in 
subsidized goods, cigarettes, and other relatively low value commodities.127 In this way the 
smuggling of migrants was initially an activity that worked within, and further solidified, the 
traditional social bonds that animated socio-economic life across northern Mali. However, as 
outlined in the previous section, this equilibrium was upended following the decentralization 
process emerging from the conflict in the 1990s and the subsequent arrival of narcotics in the 
smuggling economy of the region. Due to the high value and trans-regional supply lines 
associated with the smuggling of cocaine in particular, the narco-smuggling economy entailed a 
number of structural necessities that had the effect of re-forming the social and politics bonds 
within northern Mali, and between the north and the south. To review, this was the the necessary 
involvement of high level state authorities to secure the passage of the precious cargo across 
populated border areas (such as in between Guinea and Mali; then subsequently up to Bamako 
and beyond) as well as aerial routes that would deliver cocaine shipments directly to the north of 
Mali (ie: “Air Cocaine”). These links with complicit state authorities in turn gave some northern 
groups advantages over others to thrive in the industry, while the selective engagement with 
marginalized groups, such as the Berniche Arabs, Fulani and Imghad Tuareg, on the part of 
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Bamako allowed the state to manage the political balance of power in the north from a distance. 
Indeed, “these activities had become, by late 2011, an intrinsic part of the way businesses, 
politicians and armed groups in north Mali operated, and a channel through which the central 
state in Bamako managed its relations with the north.”128 
Thus, the smuggling networks that have emerged to cash in on the increasing flows of 
migrants that the region has witnessed since the collapse of the Libyan state were born of an 
environment that had already undergone significant “criminalization”. The previous modes of 
movement that had traditionally characterized the steady flow of migrants in the past were reliant 
on social bonds that had been firmly broken, and these migrant flows were quickly incorporated 
into Mali’s war economy. The migrants that take the Malian path towards North Africa are 
generally young males seeking employment opportunities, and largely originate from nearby 
West African countries such as Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Benin.129 While 
they often hail from other ECOWAS countries, and thus maintain the right of free movement 
from their origin countries to Mali, these migrants nonetheless must rely on the services of 
smugglers to navigate the perilous landscape and cross the southern borders of the North African 
states (i.e. Algeria.) What largely begins as a voluntary case of economic migration (though 
characterized by increasing sense of material desperation and social isolation), the journey of 
these migrants across the region is increasingly perilous and characterized by exploitation as 
political and social conditions have deteriorated. 
 Smuggling services have become more sophisticated and routes increasingly contested in 
ways that track with broader changes across the region as the control of migrant flows become 
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increasingly politicized, and in the case of Mali, militarized. As Shaw et al note in one of the 
earliest surveys of migrant smuggling across the region in 2014:  
 
Traditionally smugglers have been locals with special skills or contacts acting alone, and 
usually not part of an organized transnational criminal structure. However, recent trends 
show that smuggling activities are becoming more sophisticated and are increasingly 
evolving into professional networks, as specialized skills and resources are becoming 
more necessary to reach Europe.130 
 
Analyzing the ways in which migrant smuggling has been absorbed by Mali’s war 
economy, and where it has altered it, can be difficult. However, research is emerging that suggest 
some trends and structural pressures that the migrant smuggling economy is placing on the 
political relations in the north and the dynamics of the conflict. Firstly, migrant smuggling 
remains a relatively low value, labor intensive industry that tends to dull the motivation for 
armed actors to engage in it directly. Rather, most armed groups derive revenues from the flows 
indirectly via taxation at checkpoints, extortion and kidnapping of migrants, and offers of 
protection services. The opportunity to tax checkpoints has been a boon to local militias, as 
impromptu checkpoints often emerge where armed militants are able to line their pockets with 
cash extorted from bus passengers. These checkpoints require little less than a brandished 
firearm, which suggest that they require little overarching organizational coordination and thus 
provide a relatively easy opportunity for rank and file soldiers to supplement their income or 
provide their basic needs, thus lowering the operating costs of local militias. Along the route 
from Bamako to Gao, travelers encounter a number of checkpoints where they are forced to pay 
1,000 to 5,000 CFA (approx. $2-10) per passenger (total trip).131 Further north, as migrants 
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continue the trek north of Gao to Algeria, prices rise significantly as migrants are demanded to 
pay around 5,000 CFA per person, per checkpoint.132 It was reported that the number of migrants 
traversing this route numbered in the hundreds per week, representing a very significant stream 
of revenues (over 12 million CFA, or $22,000 a week) for the groups controlling the route. These 
northern passages largely follow the traditional routes used by Tuareg traders as they moved 
goods to and from Algeria, and have thus allowed the Ifoghas Tuareg, represented by the MNLA 
and HCUA under the banner of the CMA, to extract significant revenues from the flows. 
However, whereas the routes may be traditional, other elements surrounding the movement of 
migrants are more rooted in Mali’s current political economic environment.  
Armed groups have also marketed their violence to smugglers in the form of protection 
services for migrant convoys that are increasingly targeted for theft and kidnapping. The 
targeting of migrants demonstrates that way in which the criminalization of the region, as well as 
the increased flows of migrants, has transformed migrant flows from a the level of low level 
smuggling activity to a source of rent coveted by armed groups. The kidnapping model of 
fundraising that as behind the success of many of the region’s jihadi groups in the 2000s appears 
to have inspired an increasing number of actors to view migrants as kidnapping targets. 
 
Reports...indicate that migrants are being kept hostage and brutalised when they reach 
border posts. Smugglers call the migrants’ families and request 300,000 CFA (450 EUR) 
to secure their release. This money is sent to a Bamako contact of the smugglers, who 
collects the money and sends a message to the smugglers that the migrant may be 
released. This development is reminiscent of the situation in Libya, where state absence 
has given rise to similar exploitative practices.133 
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The prolific financial opportunities afforded by extorting migrants gives a selection 
advantage to the more violently inclined actors that are less committed to the social norms 
governing the region. Speaking of these encounters, one member of the international community 
notes, “when you encounter the bad ones, they steal everything from you—the good ones, you 
just have to pay them off to continue your drive.”134 Determining who precisely these ‘bad ones’ 
are, and whether they are individual criminals are maintain ties with politico-military groups is 
lacking in any hard evidence, however circumstantial evidence and recent history suggest some 
links with jihadi groups.  
Aside from checkpoints and extortion, revenues from migrant flows also enter the 
regional economy in other forms. At the various nodes in the transport process, migrants settle 
for a period of time to await further transport or work until they can afford the pay for the next 
leg of the journey. In Gao for instance, migrants reside in various ghettos throughout the city as 
they wait, where they are in turn charged for their stay, often referred to as the droit de ghetto, by 
the “chairman” of the neighborhood. These chairman comprise a significant element of the 
business elite of the city, making the “facilitation of irregular migration...part of the 
socioeconomic fabric of Gao.”135 Prominent ‘passuers’, those whom interact directly with the 
migrants and facilitate their logistical needs, often overlap with prominent leaders of armed 
groups and form a complex web of political, economic, and social relations that are animated by 
migrant money. Indeed, research is emerging that illustrate these relations between smugglers 
and specific armed groups, as one recent report identifies the case of “one prominent 
businessman and transport company owner active in the human smuggling trade, who shall 
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remain unnamed here, who confidential intelligence sources tie directly to the GATIA 
leadership.”136  
The role of these transport/bus companies in facilitating these flows in turn reveals links 
with the Malian state and the politicization of migrant flows. As Mali is a member of the 
ECOWAS zone, which secures the right of free movement across the signatory West African 
states, most migrants utilize commercial bus companies from surrounding countries to Bamako, 
then from Bamako on to Gao where they are transferred down the line to continue their journey 
through the more perilous northern region. Research indicates that the owners of these regional 
bus companies are often involved in larger criminal economies. “In a recent incident involving 
NOUR transport, for example, one of the company’s buses was stopped by Malian customs and 
was found to be transporting 25 ammunition boxes from Senegal into Mali.”137 Indeed, one 
regular traveler from Bamako to Gao reported to this researcher that people a number of bus 
companies exist for the trip to the north of the capital, in which the previously mentioned NOUR 
transport usually takes the longest, as the buses stop at all checkpoints where travelers are forced 
to hand over approximately 1000 CFA (approx. $2 USD) a person. Curiously, other more 
expensive companies exist that travel with an armed guard and pass straight through the 
checkpoints. It is unclear what sort of arrangements these companies have with the militias, “but 
most people figure there must be some sort of agreement...like a kickback or something that 
these companies pay for free passage.”138 This suggests the involvement of forces within the 
shadow state that facilitate and profit from the migrant flows, as these bus company owners 
“form part of a group of privileged elites with strong ties to the political center, whose position in 
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power relies on economic activities that supersede the lines between licit and illicit 
endeavors.”139 
Shadow state activity is arguably more pronounced at the lower levels of authority, seen 
in the issuance of false passports and bribes accepted by customs officials. As a Malian passport 
will grant visa free passage into Algeria, they are particularly valued by irregular migrants 
seeking to reach North Africa, which creates a strong demand for false Malian ID cards and 
passports that are readily met by opportunistic public officials. 
 
Corruption and bribes occur along the various stages of this procedure and involve 
officials at different levels. An estimated 10 to 15 percent of Malian passports are issued 
to migrants in this manner [illegally], with prices ranging between 50 and 200 EUR. 
According to a high-ranked member of the international community, rooting out the false 
passport manufacturing industry is complicated, as ‘there is always somebody to take the 
spot of those who have been arrested.’ 140 
 
Thus the migrant smuggling economy is defined by a number of political economies that 
vary by region. In the southern and central region between Bamako and Gao the smuggling 
networks are characterized by the involvement of the shadow state and local business elites, 
which evidence also suggest includes ties with select armed groups--specifically the GATIA. 
This largely maps on the previous political relations that emerged from the narco-economy, with 
government complicity acting to favor Bamako’s preferred military actors further north. Around 
the smuggling hubs of Gao and Timbuktu, local passuers and business elite reign over a 
increasingly contested urban space for the business of housing, transporting, and indeed 
exploiting migrants. Further north, control over smuggling routes remain contested, much like 
the drug routes, as the flows and value of migrants have increased. The traditional Tuareg elite 
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have indeed benefited greatly from these flows due to their control over these droits de passage 
near the Algerian border, however they have been unable to monopolize the trade as the GATIA 
(largely made up of Imghad) have been shown to also be heavily involved in the industry and 
thus pose competition to the Ifoghas.  
This political economy in the north most directly attest to this thesis’ contention that the 
networked and decentralized nature of this industry has facilitated fragmentation and 
prolongation of the conflict. The Tuareg were unable to maintain unity as the nature of the 
economic environment changed to open up new avenues of accumulation, first drug smuggling 
and now migrants, independent of the prevailing hierarchies. Indeed, comparing the conflict in 
the 1990s with the current one highlights the degree to which this inner-Tuareg chasm has 
expanded. While schisms regarding leadership and strategy certainly persisted throughout the 
previous rebellon, a fully independent Tuareg faction capable of not only charting its own path, 
but in fact taking a stance directly against the traditional Tuareg nobility never emerged. In this 
way the GATIA represents a qualitatively different element of this conflict, as the factionalism, 
in the Tuareg case, moved beyond the narrow lanes of personality or strategic disagreements to a 
full-fledged break with opposing groups pursuing contrasting aims. This intra-ethnic 
fragmentation traces through the Arab and sedentary populations as well, seen in the MAA/ 
MAA-dissident and CFMPR I/ CFMPR II breaks, respectively. While the fragmentation 
throughout the previous conflict largely took place at the inner-ethnic level, this intra-ethnic 
fragmentation highlights the degree to which diffusionary pressures has have increased across 
the Malian landscape.  
The role of the migrant smuggling economy in altering this landscape can be analyzed by 
identifying a few of the main trends that were transforming the political economic landscape of 
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Mali prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2012 as a result of the infusion of narcotic flows; then 
determining where migrant smuggling re-enforced, or tempered, these fundamental changes. The 
first main trend was that the geopolitical value of land skyrocketed as a result of the cocaine 
smuggling and the desire of groups to tax it. It seems quite clear that migrant flows re-enforced 
this trend as they represented an infusion of resources that further increased the value of the 
lands they traversed. Secondly, there was increasing alignment with the state by marginalized 
groups directly involved in drug trafficking. This trend additionally appears to have been re-
enforced, as there appears to be evidence of collusion along southern segment of route (Bamako-
Gao), between business elites (mainly bus and hotel owners) --whom are naturally tied to Malian 
political authorities, and armed groups in the platform, particularly the GATIA. This shadow 
state alliance in turn led to the third pre-war trend, which was a distinct shift in the balance of 
power towards these marginalized groups, and away from the traditional elite, whom for 
historical and strategic reasons were not natural allies of the state. The arrival of extensive 
migrant flows appears to have blunted this trend and the relative power decline of the regional 
elites, whom were able to profit quite well due to their control over the northern sections of the 
route, especially along the border with Algeria. Indeed, the MNLA, was all but done until the 
French intervention in 2013, an event many note as having significantly disrupted the regional 
flows of cocaine and eliminated much of the shadow state support or facilitation of it.141 
Following 2013 however the MNLA’s fortunes changed, as they were able to regroup and now 
maintain a strong position at the negotiating table and control over their traditional stronghold of 
Kidal. More research would need to be conducted in order to link this development with the 
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emergence of prolific migrant flows through traditionally MNLA strongholds, though the timing 
of their arrival and the extent of the revenues derived from them along this section of the route 
suggest a causal relation. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to begin investigating the political ramifications of the recent 
increase in migrant flows and the prolific smuggling economy across North Africa and the 
Sahara. From the beginning, it was mindful of the fact that these effects may articulate 
differently across different political contexts, and thus chose to focus specifically on the effects 
of migrant smuggling on conflict. This proved to be a worthy starting point given the natural 
entanglement between migration and conflict, and the need to understand the ways in which both 
phenomenon created and reinforced each other. Such an analysis is timely as contemporary 
commentary and policy focus regarding ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East view 
both conflict and irregular migration as complementary concerns. Indeed, in an era of 
unprecedented global connectivity, rising inequalities, and decreasing costs of movement, 
contemporary migrant and refugee flows have reached levels not seen since World War II. As all 
of these trends are slated to continue to solidify into the future, not to mention the compounding 
effects of climate change, understanding the effects of the emerging ‘age of migration’ on issues 
of peace and security is an urgent task. 
This final chapter will highlight a number of conclusions that have emerged throughout 
the course of this research regarding the effects of migrant smuggling on the conflict in Mali. As 
this research is exploratory in nature and a part of an ongoing effort to gain a more holistic 
understanding of the interplay between migrant smuggling and the politics of the region, these 
conclusions are somewhat tentative. Further, any case study analysis faces the challenge of 
generalizing any findings beyond the specific circumstances of the research subject (Mali in this 
case). However, giving due consideration to the pre-existing social, political, and economic 
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landscape allows the researcher to discern any changes in this landscape that could be attributed 
to the arrival of the migrant smuggling economy. This has been the guiding methodological 
focus of this thesis, and it will hopefully serve as a useful tool for identifying a number of 
common pressures that affect political systems in areas where migrants smuggling thrives.  
This section will begin with reviewing the effects of migrant smuggling on the conflict in 
Mali that has served as the analytical heart of this thesis. This analysis has allowed for the type 
of in-depth investigation as to the effect of migration flows on conflict that has largely been 
lacking from existing scholarship. It will then proceed to discuss the effect of this economy on 
issues of governance. The involvement of the state in the illicit economy of Mali-- first in the 
trafficking of drugs, then the smuggling of migrants, proved to be a crucial element in the story 
of how Mali’s evolving smuggling economy impacted the politics of the north. Analyzing these 
effects on two levels of politics--namely that of state governance and of armed groups--presents 
a relatively broad spectrum of political life that can reveal some general pressures emanating 
from the regional migrant smuggling economy.  
In terms of this thesis’ framework and hypothesis that the decentralized nature of this 
migrant smuggling has contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict in Mali, there appears to 
be suggestive evidence. While perhaps it was not the cause, as that story seems to date to a few 
years earlier to the arrival of narcotic flows, it does appear to have reinforced and prolonged the 
fragmented nature of the opposition. Here we have a case of multiple opposing factions of a 
conflict deriving consistent and sustained revenues from a common resource, and it is the nature 
of this resource that one group’s access is not necessarily contingent on taking it from the other, 
as these migrant flows traverse multiple regions and leave a consistent stream of revenues in 
their wake. This prevents any one group from capturing the industry and translating this 
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economic centralization into political control and battlefield dominance. As a particularly salient 
case, the recent severity of the Tuareg split between the Ifoghas and Imghad tribes--built upon 
structural social fault lines that date back centuries--attest to political ramifications of this 
economic transformation and the attendant increase in opportunities to challenge existing power 
structures. While these structural divisions have been latent in Tuareg society for centuries, never 
before have these faultlines rumbled so severely with the creation of two independently viable 
armed political organizations competing for alternative visions for north. Crucially, the ability to 
derive independent revenues from smuggling has allowed the Ifoghas to slip out from the 
material leverage that the Tuareg nobility traditionally held. 
This ability to cultivate and sustain an independent resource base was largely derived 
from the nature of the resources that were being smuggled. Both drug and migrant smuggling 
have not required the type of large scale cooperation between tribes that would ultimately lead to 
an integrated industry and political cooperation. GPS and communication technology has 
allowed smugglers to bypass the traditional elite on whom they previously relied for safe passage 
across the unforgiving desert landscape, and thus undercut the material linkages that previously 
sustained social hierarchies.   
In turn, the state would play a crucial role in facilitating the flows of these resources, and 
dictating who the main beneficiaries would be. Throughout the emergence of drug trafficking, it 
was the strategic mission of the state to divert the industry through the marginalized tribes of the 
north in order to neutralize the power of the traditional elite, mainly the Ifoghas Tuareg, whom 
they had historical reasons to fear. This proved quite effective in altering the balance of power in 
the north, as the nature of drug trafficking necessitated the active involvement of the state at the 
highest levels. In contrast, state complicity in migrant smuggling appears to take place at the 
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lower levels of local officials, customs officers, and bureaucrats printing false IDs and passports. 
This blunts the ability of the state to truly act as gatekeepers for this industry and direct it 
towards their strategic goals. This may account for the resurgence of the Ifoghas dominated 
MNLA following the disruption of the drug trafficking networks with the French intervention in 
2013 and subsequent arrival of large flows of irregular migrants through their territory. 
These varying levels of state involvement in turn reflect the different structural 
necessities of the industries, with migrant smuggling only requiring the complicity of lower level 
bureaucrats and local officials. This difference in turn suggests the independent effects of the 
migrant smuggling industry on the conflict, as the diffused nature of the industry and inability of 
the state to strategically direct it allows for the empowerment of irredentist groups, the MNLA in 
this case, and could go some way to accounting for the solidification of rebel fragmentation 
derived from these independent resource bases. More research is needed to validate this latter 
proposition, particularly regarding the role of migrant smuggling revenues in the resurgence of 
MNLA strength following the French intervention in 2013. 
Thus in order to discern the independent effects of migrant smuggling on the conflict, it 
has been necessary to place the industry within the context of the broader smuggling economy 
and the socio-economic transformations that were taking place in response to the emergence of 
drug trafficking. In one sense, both drug trafficking and migrant smuggling can be grouped 
together as two forms of smuggling that have worked against the grain of traditional tribal 
relations, and lent themselves to significant politicization in the forms of state corruption and 
exploitation by armed political factions. On the other hand, the varying levels of state 
involvement account for differences in terms of how the industries are controlled from the top, 
with migrant smuggling representing a more decentralized and diffused activity whose 
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beneficiaries are dictated more by geography than state direction. This could go some way 
towards accounting for the protractedness of the conflict as the segmented nature of the route 
system has allowed opposing groups, namely the MNLA (Ifoghas) and GATIA (Imghad) to 
maintain viability through extraction of this common resource that heretofore has proven 
replenishable. In the case of the MNLA and other local militias, it appears to have entrenched 
their irredentism and decreased their incentives for reconciliation with the state through the 
formation of their own “lucrative local smuggling fiefdoms.”142 
The degree to which these developments are specific the Malian case, or representative of 
general mechanisms that would articulate themselves across varying political and social contexts, 
is the next question to untangle in order to discern how the migrant smuggling industry is 
affecting the region. As this thesis has argued that the effects of the industry are largely derived 
from its structural characteristics – mainly the fragmented nature of the networks and minimal 
need for high level state complicity – there is reason to believe that this economy will produce 
common pressures across a range of contexts. So long as the industry remains defined by 
economic decentralization, the political landscape may likewise be subject to decentralization 
pressures. In terms of conflict, this decentralization occurs in the form of increased factionalism 
amongst armed groups; a proposition that could be further tested through the incorporation of 
Libya as a case study. Likewise, the implications of the industry in terms of governance and 
lower levels of corruption, or the ‘hollowing out of the state from within’ would find a ready-
made case in Niger, where migrant flows typically traverse more urbanized areas with a stronger 
state presence. Comparing these three cases would allow for a broader analysis of the effect of 
the migrant smuggling industry across the spectrum of political organizations, from armed 
 
142 Ibid. 
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militant groups to the state itself, and thus lead to generalizable conclusions regarding the macro-
effects of large irregular migration movements, and the smuggling networks that emerge to 
facilitate them, on the political life of this most vulnerable region. Indeed, further research is 
needed to both solidify the conclusion of this thesis that the migrant smuggling economy has 
contributed to factionalism in the northern Mali conflict, as well as derive larger findings 
regarding its impact on the region as a whole.  
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